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Abstract
Recent years have witnessed significant advances in reinforcement learning (RL),
which has registered great success in solving various sequential decision-making prob-
lems in machine learning. Most of the successful RL applications, e.g., the games of
Go and Poker, robotics, and autonomous driving, involve the participation of more
than one single agent, which naturally fall into the realm of multi-agent RL (MARL), a
domain with a relatively long history, and has recently re-emerged due to advances
in single-agent RL techniques. Though empirically successful, theoretical founda-
tions for MARL are relatively lacking in the literature. In this chapter, we provide
a selective overview of MARL, with focus on algorithms backed by theoretical anal-
ysis. More specifically, we review the theoretical results of MARL algorithms mainly
within two representative frameworks, Markov/stochastic games and extensive-form
games, in accordance with the types of tasks they address, i.e., fully cooperative, fully
competitive, and a mix of the two. We also introduce several significant but challeng-
ing applications of these algorithms. Orthogonal to the existing reviews on MARL,
we highlight several new angles and taxonomies of MARL theory, including learning
in extensive-form games, decentralized MARL with networked agents, MARL in the
mean-field regime, (non-)convergence of policy-based methods for learning in games,
etc. Some of the new angles extrapolate from our own research endeavors and in-
terests. Our overall goal with this chapter is, beyond providing an assessment of the
current state of the field on the mark, to identify fruitful future research directions on
theoretical studies of MARL. We expect this chapter to serve as continuing stimulus
for researchers interested in working on this exciting while challenging topic.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed sensational advances of reinforcement learning (RL) in many
prominent sequential decision-making problems, such as playing the game of Go (Silver
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et al., 2016, 2017), playing real-time strategy games (OpenAI, 2018; Vinyals et al., 2019),
robotic control (Kober et al., 2013; Lillicrap et al., 2016), playing card games (Brown and
Sandholm, 2017, 2019), and autonomous driving (Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2016), especially
accompanied with the development of deep neural networks (DNNs) for function approx-
imation (Mnih et al., 2015). Intriguingly, most of the successful applications involve the
participation of more than one single agent/player1, which should be modeled systemat-
ically as multi-agent RL (MARL) problems. Specifically, MARL addresses the sequential
decision-making problem of multiple autonomous agents that operate in a common envi-
ronment, each of which aims to optimize its own long-term return by interacting with the
environment and other agents (Busoniu et al., 2008). Besides the aforementioned popular
ones, learning in multi-agent systems finds potential applications in other subareas, in-
cluding cyber-physical systems (Adler and Blue, 2002; Wang et al., 2016), finance (O et al.,
2002; Lee et al., 2007), sensor/communication networks (Cortes et al., 2004; Choi et al.,
2009), and social science (Castelfranchi, 2001; Leibo et al., 2017).
Largely, MARL algorithms can be placed into three groups, fully cooperative, fully com-
petitive, and a mix of the two, depending on the types of settings they address. In particu-
lar, in the cooperative setting, agents collaborate to optimize a common long-term return;
while in the competitive setting, the return of agents usually sum up to zero. The mixed
setting involves both cooperative and competitive agents, with general-sum returns. Mod-
eling disparate MARL settings requires frameworks spanning from optimization theory,
dynamic programming, game theory, and decentralized control, see §2.2 for more detailed
discussions. In spite of these existing multiple frameworks, several challenges in MARL
are in fact common across the different settings, especially for the theoretical analysis.
Specifically, first, the learning goals in MARL are multidimensional, as the objective of all
agents are not necessarily aligned, which brings up the challenge of dealing with equilib-
rium points, as well as some additional performance criteria beyond return-optimization,
such as the efficiency of communication/coordination, and robustness against potential
adversarial agents. Moreover, as all agents are improving their policies according to their
own interests concurrently, the environment faced by each agent becomes non-stationary.
This breaks or invalidates the basic framework of most theoretical analyses in the single-
agent setting. Furthermore, the joint action space that increases exponentially with the
number of agents may cause scalability issues, known as the combinatorial nature of MARL
(Hernandez-Leal et al., 2018). Additionally, the information structure, i.e., who knows
what, in MARL is more involved, as each agent has limited access to the observations of
others, leading to possibly suboptimal decision rules locally. A detailed elaboration on
the underlying challenges can be found in §3.
There has in fact been no shortage of efforts attempting to address the above chal-
lenges. See Busoniu et al. (2008) for a comprehensive overview of earlier theories and
algorithms on MARL. Recently, this domain has gained resurgence of interest due to the
advances of single-agent RL techniques. Indeed, a huge volume of work on MARL has ap-
peared lately, focusing on either identifying new learning criteria and/or setups (Foerster
et al., 2016; Zazo et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2018; Subramanian and Mahajan, 2019), or
developing new algorithms for existing setups, thanks to the development of deep learn-
1Hereafter, we will use agent and player interchangeably.
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ing (Heinrich and Silver, 2016; Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2017; Gupta et al., 2017;
Omidshafiei et al., 2017; Kawamura et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2019), operations research
(Mazumdar and Ratliff, 2018; Jin et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019; Sidford et al., 2019), and
multi-agent systems (Oliehoek and Amato, 2016; Arslan and Yu¨ksel, 2017; Yongacoglu
et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019). Nevertheless, not all the efforts are placed under rig-
orous theoretical footings, partly due to the limited understanding of even single-agent
deep RL theories, and partly due to the inherent challenges in multi-agent settings. As
a consequence, it is imperative to review and organize the MARL algorithms with theo-
retical guarantees, in order to highlight the boundary of existing research endeavors, and
stimulate potential future directions on this topic.
In this chapter, we provide a selective overview of theories and algorithms in MARL,
together with several significant while challenging applications. More specifically, we fo-
cus on two representative frameworks of MARL, namely, Markov/stochastic games and
extensive-form games, in discrete-time settings as in standard single-agent RL. In con-
formity with the aforementioned three groups, we review and pay particular attention to
MARL algorithms with convergence and complexity analysis, most of which are fairly re-
cent. With this focus in mind, we note that our overview is by no means comprehensive.
In fact, besides the classical reference Busoniu et al. (2008), there are several other re-
views on MARL that have appeared recently, due to the resurgence of MARL (Hernandez-
Leal et al., 2017, 2018; Nguyen et al., 2018; Oroojlooy Jadid and Hajinezhad, 2019). We
would like to emphasize that these reviews provide views and taxonomies that are com-
plementary to ours: Hernandez-Leal et al. (2017) surveys the works that are specifically
devised to address opponent-induced non-stationarity, one of the challenges we discuss in
§3; Hernandez-Leal et al. (2018); Nguyen et al. (2018) are relatively more comprehensive,
but with the focal point on deep MARL, a subarea with scarce theories thus far; Oroo-
jlooy Jadid and Hajinezhad (2019), on the other hand, focuses on algorithms in the coop-
erative setting only, though the review within this setting is extensive.
Finally, we spotlight several new angles and taxonomies that are comparatively under-
explored in the existing MARL reviews, primarily owing to our own research endeavors
and interests. First, we discuss the framework of extensive-form games in MARL, in addi-
tion to the conventional one of Markov games, or even simplified repeated games (Busoniu
et al., 2008; Hernandez-Leal et al., 2017, 2018); second, we summarize the progresses of
a recently boosting subarea: decentralized MARL with networked agents, as an extrapola-
tion of our early works on this (Zhang et al., 2018,a,b); third, we bring about the mean-field
regime into MARL, as a remedy for the case with an extremely large population of agents;
fourth, we highlight some recent advances in optimization theory, which shed lights on
the (non-)convergence of policy-based methods for MARL, especially zero-sum games.
We have also reviewed some the literature on MARL in partially observed settings, but
without using deep RL as heuristic solutions. We expect these new angles to help iden-
tify fruitful future research directions, and more importantly, inspire researchers with
interests in establishing rigorous theoretical foundations on MARL.
Roadmap. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In §2, we introduce the
background of MARL: standard algorithms for single-agent RL, and the frameworks of
MARL. In §3, we summarize several challenges in developing MARL theory, in addition
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to the single-agent counterparts. A series of MARL algorithms, mostly with theoretical
guarantees, are reviewed and organized in §4, according to the types of tasks they ad-
dress. In §5, we briefly introduce a few recent successes of MARL driven by the algorithms
mentioned, followed by conclusions and several open research directions outlined in §6.
2 Background
In this section, we provide the necessary background on reinforcement learning, in both
single- and multi-agent settings.
2.1 Single-Agent RL
A reinforcement learning agent is modeled to perform sequential decision-making by in-
teracting with the environment. The environment is usually formulated as a Markov de-
cision process (MDP), which is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A Markov decision process is defined by a tuple (S ,A,P ,R,γ), where S
and A denote the state and action spaces, respectively; P : S × A → ∆(S) denotes the
transition probability from any state s ∈ S to any state s′ ∈ S for any given action a ∈ A;
R : S ×A×S → R is the reward function that determines the immediate reward received
by the agent for a transition from (s,a) to s′; γ ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor that trades off
the instantaneous and future rewards.
As a standard model, MDP has been widely adopted to characterize the decision-
making of an agent with full observability of the system state s.2 At each time t, the agent
chooses to execute an action at in face of the system state st, which causes the system
to transition to st+1 ∼ P (· |st, at). Moreover, the agent receives an instantaneous reward
R(st, at, st+1). The goal of solving the MDP is thus to find a policy pi : S → ∆(A), a mapping
from the state space S to the distribution over the action space A, so that at ∼ pi(· |st) and
the discounted accumulated reward
E
[∑
t≥0
γ tR(st, at, st+1)
∣∣∣∣∣at ∼ pi(· |st), s0]
is maximized. Accordingly, one can define the state-action function/Q-function, and value
function under policy pi as
Qpi(s,a) = E
[∑
t≥0
γ tR(st, at, st+1)
∣∣∣∣∣at ∼ pi(· |st), a0 = a,s0 = s],
Vpi(s) = E
[∑
t≥0
γ tR(st, at, st+1)
∣∣∣∣∣at ∼ pi(· |st), s0 = s]
2The partially observed MDP (POMDP) model is usually advocated when the agent has no access to the
exact system state but only an observation of the state. See Monahan (1982); Cassandra (1998) for more
details on the POMDP model.
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for any s ∈ S and a ∈ A, which are the discounted accumulated reward starting from
(s0, a0) = (s,a) and s0 = s, respectively. The ones corresponding to the optimal policy pi∗ are
usually referred to as the optimal Q-function and the optimal value function, respectively.
By virtue of the Markovian property, the optimal policy can be obtained by dynamic-
programming/backward induction approaches, e.g., value iteration and policy iteration
algorithms (Bertsekas, 2005), which require the knowledge of the transition probability
and the form of reward function. Reinforcement learning, on the other hand, is to find
such an optimal policy without knowing the model. The RL agent learns the policy from
experiences collected by interacting with the environment. By and large, RL algorithms
can be categorized into two mainstream types, value-based and policy-based methods.
2.1.1 Value-Based Methods
Value-based RL methods are devised to find a good estimate of the state-action value
function, namely, the optimal Q-functionQpi∗ . The (approximate) optimal policy can then
be extracted by taking the greedy action of the Q-function estimate. One of the most
popular value-based algorithms is Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992), where the agent
maintains an estimate of the Q-value function Qˆ(s,a). When transitioning from state-
action pair (s,a) to next state s′, the agent receives a payoff r and updates the Q-function
according to:
Qˆ(s,a)← (1−α)Qˆ(s,a) +α
[
r +γmax
a′
Qˆ(s′, a′)
]
, (2.1)
where α > 0 is the stepsize/learning rate. Under certain conditions on α, Q-learning can
be proved to converge to the optimal Q-value function almost surely (Watkins and Dayan,
1992; Szepesva´ri and Littman, 1999), with discrete and finite state and action spaces.
Moreover, when combined with neural networks for function approximation, deep Q-
learning has achieved great empirical breakthroughs in human-level control applications
(Mnih et al., 2015). Another popular on-policy value-based method is SARSA, whose con-
vergence was established in Singh et al. (2000) for finite-space settings.
An alternative while popular value-based RL algorithm is Monte-Carlo tree search
(MCTS) (Chang et al., 2005; Kocsis and Szepesva´ri, 2006; Coulom, 2006), which estimates
the optimal value function by constructing a search tree via Monte-Carlo simulations.
Tree polices that judiciously select actions to balance exploration-exploitation are used to
build and update the search tree. The most common tree policy is to apply the UCB1 (UCB
stands for upper confidence bound) algorithm, which was originally devised for stochastic
multi-arm bandit problems (Agrawal, 1995; Auer et al., 2002), to each node of the tree.
This yields the popular UCT algorithm (Kocsis and Szepesva´ri, 2006). Convergence guar-
antee of MCTS had not been fully characterized until very recently (Jiang et al., 2018;
Shah et al., 2019).
Besides, another significant task regarding value functions in RL is to estimate the
value function associated with a given policy (not only the optimal one). This task, usually
referred to as policy evaluation, has been tackled by algorithms that follow a similar update
as (2.1), named temporal difference (TD) learning (Tesauro, 1995; Tsitsiklis and Van Roy,
1997; Sutton and Barto, 2018). Some other common policy evaluation algorithms with
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convergence guarantees include gradient TD methods with linear (Sutton et al., 2008,
2009; Liu et al., 2015), and nonlinear function approximations (Bhatnagar et al., 2009).
See Dann et al. (2014) for a more detailed review on policy evaluation.
2.1.2 Policy-Based Methods
Another type of RL algorithms directly searches over the policy space, which is usually es-
timated by parameterized function approximators like neural networks, namely, approxi-
mate pi(· |s) ≈ piθ(· |s). As a consequence, the most straightforward idea, which is to update
the parameter along the gradient direction of the long-term reward, has been instantiated
by the policy gradient (PG) method. As a key premise for the idea, the closed-form of PG
is given as (Sutton et al., 2000)
∇J(θ) = Ea∼piθ(· |s),s∼ηpiθ (·)
[
Qpiθ (s,a)∇ logpiθ(a |s)
]
, (2.2)
where J(θ) and Qpiθ are the expected return and Q-function under policy piθ, respectively,∇ logpiθ(a |s) is the score function of the policy, and ηpiθ is the state occupancy measure,
either discounted or ergodic, under policy piθ. Then, various policy gradient methods, in-
cluding REINFORCE (Williams, 1992), G(PO)MDP (Baxter and Bartlett, 2001), and actor-
critic algorithms (Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000; Bhatnagar et al., 2009), have been proposed
by estimating the gradient in different ways. A similar idea also applies to deterministic
policies in continuous-action settings, whose PG has been derived by Silver et al. (2014).
Besides gradient-based ones, several other policy optimization methods have achieved
state-of-the-art performance in many applications, including PPO (Schulman et al., 2017),
TRPO (Schulman et al., 2015), and soft actor-critic (Haarnoja et al., 2018).
Compared with value-based methods, policy-based ones enjoy better convergence guar-
antees (Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000; Yang et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019; Agarwal et al.,
2019), especially with neural networks for function approximation (Liu et al., 2019; Wang
et al., 2019), which can readily handle massive or even continuous state-action spaces.
2.2 Multi-Agent RL Framework
In a similar vein, multi-agent RL also addresses sequential decision-making problems, but
with more than one agent involved. In particular, both the evolution of the system state
and the reward received by each agent are influenced by the joint actions of all agents.
More intriguingly, each agent has its own long-term reward to optimize, which now be-
comes a function of the policies of all other agents. Such a general model finds broad
applications in practice, see §5 for a detailed review of several significant ones.
In general, there exist two seemingly different but closely related theoretical frame-
works for MARL, Markov/stochastic games and extensive-form games, as to be introduced
next. Evolution of the systems under different frameworks are illustrated in Figure 1.
2.2.1 Markov/Stochastic Games
One direct generalization of MDP that captures the intertwinement of multiple agents is
Markov games (MGs), also known as stochastic games (Shapley, 1953). Originated from
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(a) MDP (b) Markov game (c) Extensive-form game
Figure 1: Schematic diagrams for the system evolution of a Markov decision process,
a Markov game, and an extensive-form game, which correspond to the frameworks for
single- and multi-agent RL, respectively. Specifically, in an MDP as in (a), the agent ob-
serves the state s and receives reward r from the system, after outputting the action a; in
an MG as in (b), all agents choose actions ai simultaneously, after observing the system
state s and receiving each individual reward r i ; in a two-player extensive-form game as in
(c), the agents make decisions on choosing actions ai alternately, and receive each individ-
ual reward r i(z) at the end of the game, with z being the terminal history. In the imperfect
information case, player 2 is uncertain about where he/she is in the game, which makes
the information set non-singleton.
the seminal work Littman (1994), the framework of MGs has long been used in the lit-
erature to develop MARL algorithms, see §4 for more details. We introduce the formal
definition as below.
Definition 2.2. A Markov game is defined by a tuple (N ,S , {Ai}i∈N ,P , {Ri}i∈N ,γ), where
N = {1, · · · ,N } denotes the set of N > 1 agents, S denotes the state space observed by all
agents,Ai denotes the action space of agent i. LetA :=A1×· · ·×AN , then P : S ×A→ ∆(S)
denotes the transition probability from any state s ∈ S to any state s′ ∈ S for any joint
action a ∈ A; Ri : S × A × S → R is the reward function that determines the immediate
reward received by agent i for a transition from (s,a) to s′; γ ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor.
At time t, each agent i ∈ N executes an action ait, according to the system state st. The
system then transitions to state st+1, and rewards each agent i by Ri(st, at, st+1). The goal of
agent i is to optimize its own long-term reward, by finding the policy pii : S → ∆(Ai) such
that ait ∼ pii(· |st). As a consequence, the value-function V i : S → R of agent i becomes a
function of the joint policy pi : S → ∆(A) defined as pi(a |s) := ∏i∈N pii(ai |s). In particular,
for any joint policy pi and state s ∈ S ,
V i
pii ,pi−i (s) := E
[∑
t≥0
γ tRi(st, at, st+1)
∣∣∣∣∣ait ∼ pii(· |st), s0 = s], (2.3)
where −i represents the indices of all agents in N except agent i. Hence, the solution
concept of MG deviates from that of MDP, since the optimal performance of each agent is
controlled not only by its own policy, but also the choices of all other players of the game.
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The most common solution concept, Nash equilibrium (NE), is defined as follows (Bas¸ar
and Olsder, 1999).
Definition 2.3. A Nash equilibrium of the Markov game (N ,S , {Ai}i∈N ,P , {Ri}i∈N ,γ) is a
joint policy pi∗ = (pi1,∗, · · · ,piN,∗), such that for any s ∈ S and i ∈ N
V i
pii,∗,pi−i,∗(s) ≥ V ipii ,pi−i,∗(s), for any pii .
Nash equilibrium characterizes an equilibrium pointpi∗, from which none of the agents
has any incentive to deviate. In other words, for any agent i ∈ N , the policy pii,∗ is the best-
response of pi−i,∗. As a standard learning goal for MARL, NE always exists for discounted
MGs (Filar and Vrieze, 2012), but may not be unique in general. Most of the MARL algo-
rithms are contrived to converge to such an equilibrium point.
The framework of Markov games is general enough to umbrella various MARL settings
summarized below.
Cooperative Setting:
In a fully cooperative setting, all agents usually share a common reward function, i.e.,
R1 = R2 = · · · = RN = R. We note that this model is also referred to as multi-agent MDPs
(MMDPs) in the AI community (Boutilier, 1996; Lauer and Riedmiller, 2000), and Markov
teams/team Markov games in the control/game theory community (Yoshikawa, 1978; Ho,
1980; Wang and Sandholm, 2003; Mahajan, 2008). Moreover, from the game-theoretic
perspective, this cooperative setting can also be viewed as a special case of Markov po-
tential games (Gonza´lez-Sa´nchez and Herna´ndez-Lerma, 2013; Zazo et al., 2016; Valcar-
cel Macua et al., 2018), with the potential function being the common accumulated re-
ward. With this model in mind, the value function and Q-function are identical to all
agents, which thus enables the single-agent RL algorithms, e.g., Q-learning update (2.1),
to be applied, if all agents are coordinated as one decision maker. The global optimum for
cooperation now constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Besides the common-reward model, another slightly more general and surging model
for cooperative MARL considers team-average reward (Kar et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2018;
Doan et al., 2019). Specifically, agents are allowed to have different reward functions,
which may be kept private to each agent, while the goal for cooperation is to optimize the
long-term reward corresponding to the average reward R¯(s,a, s′) := N−1 ·∑i∈N Ri(s,a, s′)
for any (s,a, s′) ∈ S ×A×S . The average-reward model, which allows more heterogeneity
among agents, includes the model above as a special case. It also preserves privacy among
agents, and facilitates the development of decentralized MARL algorithms (Kar et al., 2013;
Zhang et al., 2018; Wai et al., 2018). Such heterogeneity also necessitates the incorpora-
tion of communication protocols into MARL, and the analysis of communication-efficient
MARL algorithms.
Competitive Setting:
Fully competitive setting in MARL is typically modeled as zero-sum Markov games,
namely,
∑
i∈N Ri(s,a, s′) = 0 for any (s,a, s′). For ease of algorithm design and analysis,
most literature focused on two agents that compete against each other (Littman, 1994),
where clearly the reward of one agent is exactly the loss of the other. In addition to direct
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applications to game-playing (Littman, 1994; Silver et al., 2017; OpenAI, 2017), zero-sum
games also serve as a model for robust learning, since the uncertainty that impedes the
learning process of the agent can be accounted for as a fictitious opponent in the game
that is always against the agent (Jacobson, 1973; Bas¸ar and Bernhard, 1995; Zhang et al.,
2019). Therefore, the Nash equilibrium yields a robust policy that optimizes the worst-case
long-term reward.
Mixed Setting:
Mixed setting is also known as the general-sum game setting, where no restriction is
imposed on the goal and relationship among agents (Hu and Wellman, 2003; Littman,
2001). Each agent is self-interested, whose reward may be conflicting with others’. Equi-
librium solution concepts from game theory, such as Nash equilibrium (Bas¸ar and Olsder,
1999), have the most significant influence on algorithms that are developed for this gen-
eral setting. Furthermore, we include the setting with both fully cooperative and com-
petitive agents, for example, two zero-sum competitive teams with cooperative agents in
each team (Lagoudakis and Parr, 2003; Zhang et al., 2018b; OpenAI, 2018), as instances
of the mixed setting as well.
2.2.2 Extensive-Form Games
Even though they constitute a classical formalism for MARL, Markov games can only han-
dle the fully observed case, i.e., the agent has perfect information on the system state st and
the executed action at at time t. Nonetheless, a plethora of MARL applications involve
agents with only partial observability, i.e., imperfect information of the game. Extension of
Markov games to partially observed case may be applicable, which, however, is challeng-
ing to solve, even under the cooperative setting (Oliehoek and Amato, 2016; Bernstein
et al., 2002).3
In contrast, another framework, named extensive-form games (Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994; Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008), can handily model imperfect information for
multi-agent decision-making. This framework is rooted in computational game theory
and has been shown to admit polynomial-time algorithms under mild conditions (Koller
and Megiddo, 1992). We formally introduce the framework of extensive-form games as
follows.
Definition 2.4. An extensive-form game is defined by (N ∪ {c},H,Z,A, {Ri}i∈N , τ,pic,S),
whereN = {1, . . . ,N } denotes the set of N > 1 agents, and c is a special agent called chance
or nature, which has a fixed stochastic policy that specifies the randomness of the environ-
ment. Besides, A is the set of all possible actions that agents can take and H is the set of
all possible histories, where each history is a sequence of actions taken from the beginning
of the game. Let A(h) = {a |ha ∈ H} denote the set of actions available after a nonterminal
history h. Suppose an agent takes action a ∈ A(h) given history h ∈ H, which then leads
to a new history ha ∈ H. Among all histories, Z ⊆ H is a subset of terminal histories that
represents the completion of a game. A utility is assigned to each agent i ∈ N at a terminal
3Partially observed Markov games under the cooperative setting are usually formulated as decentralized
POMDP (Dec-POMDP) problems. See §4.1.3 for more discussions on this setting.
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history, dictated by the function Ri : Z → R. Moreover, τ : H → N ∪ {c} is the identifica-
tion function that specifies which agent takes the action at each history. If τ(h) = c, the
chance agent takes an action a according to its policy pic, i.e., a ∼ pic(· |h). Furthermore,
S is the partition of H such that for any s ∈ S and any h,h′ ∈ s, we have τ(h) = τ(h′) and
A(h) =A(h′). In other words, histories h and h′ in the same partition are indistinguishable
to the agent that is about to take action, namely τ(h). The elements in S are referred to as
information states.
Intuitively, the imperfect information of an extensive-form game is reflected by the
fact that agents cannot distinguish between histories in the same information set. Since
we have τ(h) = τ(h′) andA(h) =A(h′) for all h,h′ ∈ s, for ease of presentation, in the sequel,
for all h ∈ s, we let A(s) and τ(s) denote A(h) and τ(h), respectively. We also define a map-
ping I : H→ S by letting I(h) = s if h ∈ s. Moreover, we only consider games where both
H and A are finite sets. To simplify the notation, for any two histories h,h′ ∈ H, we refer
to h as a prefix of h′, denoted by h v h′, if h′ can be reached from h by taking a sequence of
actions. In this case, we call h′ a suffix of h. Furthermore, we assume throughout that the
game features perfect recall, which implies that each agent remembers the sequence of the
information states and actions that have led to its current information state. The assump-
tion of perfect recall is commonly made in the literature, which enables the existence of
polynomial-time algorithms for solving the game (Koller and Megiddo, 1992). More im-
portantly, by the celebrated Kuhn’s theorem (Kuhn, 1953), under such an assumption, to
find the set of Nash equilibria, it suffices to restrict the derivation to the set of behavioral
policies which map each information set s ∈ S to a probability distribution over A(s). For
any i ∈ N , let S i = {s ∈ S : τ(s) = i} be the set of information states of agent i. A joint policy
of the agents is denoted by pi = (pi1, . . . ,piN ), where pii : S i → ∆(A(s)) is the policy of agent
i. For any history h and any joint policy pi, we define the reach probability of h under pi as
ηpi(h) =
∏
h′ : h′avh
piτ(h
′)(a | I(h′)) =
∏
i∈N∪{c}
∏
h′ : h′avh,τ(h′)=i
pii(a | I(h′)), (2.4)
which specifies the probability that h is created when all agents follow pi. We similarly
define the reach probability of an information state s under pi as ηpi(s) =
∑
h∈s ηpi(h). The
expected utility of agent i ∈ N is thus given by ∑z∈Z ηpi(z) · Ri(z), which is denoted by
Ri(pi) for simplicity. Now we are ready to introduce the solution concept for extensive-
form games, i.e., Nash equilibrium and its -approximation, as follows.
Definition 2.5. An -Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form game represented by (N ∪
{c},H,Z,A, {Ri}i∈N , τ,pic,S) is a joint policy pi∗ = (pi1,∗, · · · ,piN,∗), such that for any i ∈ N ,
Ri(pii,∗,pi−i,∗) ≥ Ri(pii ,pi−i,∗)− , for any policy pii of agent i.
Here pi−i denotes the joint policy of agents inN \{i} where agent j adopts policy pij for all
j ∈ N \ {i}. Additionally, if  = 0, pi∗ constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Various Settings:
Extensive-form games are in general used to model non-cooperative settings. Specif-
ically, zero-sum/constant-sum utility with
∑
i∈N Ri = k for some constant k corresponds
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to the fully competitive setting; general-sum utility function results in the mixed setting.
More importantly, settings of different information structures can also be characterized
by extensive-form games. In particular, a perfect information game is one where each in-
formation set is a singleton, i.e., for any s ∈ S , |s| = 1; an imperfect information game is one
where there exists s ∈ S , |s| > 1. In other words, with imperfect information, the informa-
tion state s used for decision-making represents more than one possible history, and the
agent cannot distinguish between them.
Among various settings, the zero-sum imperfect information setting has been the main
focus of theoretical studies that bridge MARL and extensive-form games (Zinkevich et al.,
2008; Heinrich et al., 2015; Srinivasan et al., 2018; Omidshafiei et al., 2019). It has
also motivated MARL algorithms that revolutionized competitive setting applications like
Poker AI (Rubin and Watson, 2011; Brown and Sandholm, 2019).
Connection to Markov Games:
Note that the two formalisms in Definitions 2.2 and 2.4 are connected. In particular,
for simultaneous-move Markov games, the choices of actions by other agents are unknown
to an agent, which thus leads to different histories that can be aggregated as one informa-
tion state s. Histories in these games are then sequences of joint actions, and the dis-
counted accumulated reward instantiates the utility at the end of the game. Conversely,
by simply setting Aj = ∅ at the state s for agents j , τ(s), the extensive-form game reduces
to a Markov game with state-dependent action spaces. See Lanctot et al. (2019) for a more
detailed discussion on the connection.
Remark 2.6 (Other MARL Frameworks). Several other theoretical frameworks for MARL
also exist in the literature, e.g., normal-form and/or repeated games (Claus and Boutilier,
1998; Bowling and Veloso, 2001; Kapetanakis and Kudenko, 2002; Conitzer and Sand-
holm, 2007), and partially observed Markov games (Hansen et al., 2004; Amato et al.,
2013; Amato and Oliehoek, 2015). However, the former framework can be viewed as a
special case of MGs, with a singleton state; most early theories of MARL in this frame-
work have been restricted to small scale problems (Bowling and Veloso, 2001; Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2007; Kapetanakis and Kudenko, 2002) only. MARL in the latter frame-
work, on the other hand, is inherently challenging to address in general (Bernstein et al.,
2002; Hansen et al., 2004), leading to relatively scarce theories in the literature. Due to
space limitation, we do not introduce these models here in any detail. We will briefly
review MARL algorithms under some of these models, especially the partially observed
setting, in §4, though. Interested readers are referred to the early review Busoniu et al.
(2008) for more discussions on MARL in normal-form/repeated games.
3 Challenges in MARL Theory
Despite a general model with broad applications, MARL suffers from several challenges
in theoretical analysis, in addition to those that arise in single-agent RL. We summarize
below the challenges that we regard as fundamental in developing theories for MARL.
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3.1 Non-Unique Learning Goals
Unlike single-agent RL, where the goal of the agent is to maximize the long-term return ef-
ficiently, the learning goals of MARL can be vague at times. In fact, as argued in Shoham
et al. (2003), the unclarity of the problems being addressed is the fundamental flaw in
many early MARL works. Indeed, the goals that need to be considered in the analysis of
MARL algorithms can be multi-dimensional. The most common goal, which has, how-
ever, been challenged in Shoham et al. (2003), is the convergence to Nash equilibrium
as defined in §2.2. By definition, NE characterizes the point that no agent will deviate
from, if any algorithm finally converges. This is undoubtedly a reasonable solution con-
cept in game theory, under the assumption that the agents are all rational, and are capable
of perfectly reasoning and infinite mutual modeling of agents. However, with bounded
rationality, the agents may only be able to perform finite mutual modeling (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2008). As a result, the learning dynamics that are devised to converge to
NE may not be justifiable for practical MARL agents. Instead, the goal may be focused on
designing the best learning strategy for a given agent and a fixed class of the other agents in
the game. In fact, these two goals are styled as equilibrium agenda and AI agenda in Shoham
et al. (2003).
Besides, it has also been controversial that convergence (to the equilibrium point) is the
dominant performance criterion for MARL algorithm analysis. In fact, it has been recog-
nized in Zinkevich et al. (2006) that value-based MARL algorithms fail to converge to the
stationary NE of general-sum Markov games, which motivated the new solution concept
of cyclic equilibrium therein, at which the agents cycle rigidly through a set of stationary
policies, i.e., not converging to any NE policy. Alternatively, Bowling and Veloso (2001,
2002) separate the learning goal into being both stable and rational, where the former
ensures the algorithm to be convergent, given a predefined, targeted class of opponents’
algorithms, while the latter requires the convergence to a best-response when the other
agents remain stationary. If all agents are both stable and rational, convergence to NE
naturally arises in this context. Moreover, the notion of regret introduces another angle to
capture agents’ rationality, which measures the performance of the algorithm compared
to the best hindsight static strategy (Bowling and Veloso, 2001; Bowling, 2005). No-regret
algorithms with asymptotically zero average regret guarantee the convergence to the equi-
libria of certain games (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001; Bowling, 2005; Zinkevich et al., 2008),
which essentially guarantee that the agent is not exploited by others.
In addition to the goals concerning optimizing the return, several other goals that are
special to multi-agent systems have also drawn increasing attention. For example, Kasai
et al. (2008); Foerster et al. (2016); Kim et al. (2019) investigate learning to communicate,
in order for the agents to better coordinate. Such a concern on communication proto-
cols has naturally inspired the recent studies on communication-efficient MARL (Chen
et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2019; Ren and Haupt, 2019; Kim et al., 2019). Other important
goals include how to learn without over-fitting certain agents (He et al., 2016; Lowe et al.,
2017; Grover et al., 2018), and how to learn robustly with either malicious/adversarial or
failed/dysfunctional learning agents (Gao et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019).
Still in their infancy, some works concerning aforementioned goals provide only empirical
results, leaving plenty of room for theoretical studies.
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3.2 Non-Stationarity
Another key challenge of MARL lies in the fact that multiple agents usually learn concur-
rently, causing the environment faced by each individual agent to be non-stationary. In
particular, the action taken by one agent affects the reward of other opponent agents, and
the evolution of the state. As a result, the learning agent is required to account for how
the other agents behave and adapt to the joint behavior accordingly. This invalidates the
stationarity assumption for establishing the convergence of single-agent RL algorithms,
namely, the Markov property of the environment such that the individual reward and
current state depend only on the previous state and action taken. This precludes the di-
rect use of mathematical tools for single-agent RL analysis in MARL.
Indeed, theoretically, if the agent ignores this issue and optimizes its own policy as-
suming a stationary environment, which is usually referred to as an independent learner,
the algorithms may fail to converge (Tan, 1993; Claus and Boutilier, 1998), except for
several special settings (Arslan and Yu¨ksel, 2017; Yongacoglu et al., 2019). Empirically,
however, independent learning may achieve satisfiable performance in practice (Matignon
et al., 2012; Foerster et al., 2017). As one of the most well-known issues in MARL, non-
stationarity has long been recognized in the literature (Busoniu et al., 2008; Tuyls and
Weiss, 2012). A recent comprehensive survey Hernandez-Leal et al. (2017) peculiarly
provides an overview on how it is modeled and addressed by state-of-the-art multi-agent
learning algorithms. We thus do not include more discussion on this challenge, and refer
interested readers to Hernandez-Leal et al. (2017).
3.3 Scalability Issue
To handle non-stationarity, each individual agent may need to account for the joint ac-
tion space, whose dimension increases exponentially with the number of agents. This is
also referred to as the combinatorial nature of MARL (Hernandez-Leal et al., 2018). Hav-
ing a large number of agents complicates the theoretical analysis, especially convergence
analysis, of MARL. This argument is substantiated by the fact that theories on MARL for
the two-player zero-sum setting are much more extensive and advanced than those for
general-sum settings with more than two agents, see §4 for a detailed comparison. One
possible remedy for the scalability issue is to assume additionally the factorized structures
of either the value or reward functions with regard to the action dependence; see Guestrin
et al. (2002a,b); Kok and Vlassis (2004) for the original heuristic ideas, and Sunehag et al.
(2018); Rashid et al. (2018) for recent empirical progress. Relevant theoretical analysis
had not been established until recently (Qu and Li, 2019), which considers a special de-
pendence structure, and develops a provably convergent model-based (not RL) algorithm.
Another theoretical challenge of MARL that is brought about independently of, but
worsened by, the scalability issue, is to build up theories for deep multi-agent RL. Partic-
ularly, scalability issues necessitate the use of function approximation, especially deep
neural networks, in MARL. Though empirically successful, the theoretical analysis of
deep MARL is an almost uncharted territory, with the currently limited understanding
of deep learning theory, not alone the deep RL theory. This is included as one of the
future research directions in §6.
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(a) Centralized setting (b) Decentralized setting (c) Fully decentralized setting
with networked agents
Figure 2: Three representative information structures in MARL. Specifically, in (a), there
exists a central controller that can aggregate information from the agents, e.g., joint ac-
tions, joint rewards, and joint observations, and even design policies for all agents. The
information exchanged between the central controller and the agents can thus include
both some private observations from the agents, and the local policies designed for each
agent from the controller. In both (b) and (c), there is no such a central controller, and
are thus both referred to as decentralized structures. In (b), agents are connected via a
possibly time-varying communication network, so that the local information can spread
across the network, by information exchange with only each agent’s neighbors. (b) is more
common in cooperative MARL settings. In (c), the agents are full decentralized, with no
explicit information exchange with each other. Instead, each agent makes decisions based
on its local observations, without any coordination and/or aggregation of data. The local
observations that vary across agents, however, may contain some global information, e.g.,
the joint actions of other agents, namely the control sharing information structure (Maha-
jan, 2013). Such a fully decentralized structure can also be found in many game-theoretic
learning algorithms.
3.4 Various Information Structures
Compared to the single-agent case, the information structure of MARL, namely, who
knows what at the training and execution, is more involved. For example, in the framework
of Markov games, it suffices to observe the instantaneous state st, in order for each agent
to make decisions, since the local policy pii maps from S to ∆(Ai). On the other hand,
for extensive-form games, each agent may need to recall the history of past decisions, un-
der the common perfect recall assumption. Furthermore, as self-interested agents, each
agent can scarcely access either the policy or the rewards of the opponents, but at most the
action samples taken by them. This partial information aggravates the issues caused by
non-stationarity, as the samples can hardly recover the exact behavior of the opponents’
underlying policies, which increases the non-stationarity viewed by individual agents.
The extreme case is the aforementioned independent learning scheme, which assumes the
observability of only the local action and reward, and suffers from non-convergence in
general (Tan, 1993).
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Learning schemes resulting from various information structures lead to various levels
of difficulty for theoretical analysis. Specifically, to mitigate the partial information issue
above, a great deal of work assumes the existence of a central controller that can collect
information such as joint actions, joint rewards, and joint observations, and even design
policies for all agents (Hansen et al., 2004; Oliehoek and Amato, 2014; Lowe et al., 2017;
Foerster et al., 2017; Gupta et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2018; Dibangoye and Buffet, 2018;
Chen et al., 2018; Rashid et al., 2018). This structure gives birth to the popular learning
scheme of centralized-learning-decentralized-execution, which stemmed from the works on
planning for the partially observed setting, namely, Dec-POMDPs (Hansen et al., 2004;
Oliehoek and Amato, 2014; Kraemer and Banerjee, 2016), and has been widely adopted
in recent (deep) MARL works (Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2017; Gupta et al., 2017;
Foerster et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018; Rashid et al., 2018). For cooperative settings,
this learning scheme greatly simplifies the analysis, allowing the use of tools for single-
agent RL analysis. Though, for non-cooperative settings with heterogeneous agents, this
scheme does not significantly simplify the analysis, as the learning goals of the agents are
not aligned, see §3.1.
Nonetheless, generally such a central controller does not exist in many applications,
except the ones that can easily access a simulator, such as video games and robotics.
As a consequence, a fully decentralized learning scheme is preferred, which includes the
aforementioned independent learning scheme as a special case. To address the non-
convergence issue in independent learning, agents are usually allowed to exchange/share
local information with their neighbors over a communication network (Kar et al., 2013;
Macua et al., 2015, 2017; Zhang et al., 2018,a,b; Lee et al., 2018; Wai et al., 2018; Doan
et al., 2019; Suttle et al., 2019; Doan et al., 2019; Lin et al., 2019). We refer to this set-
ting as a decentralized one with networked agents. Theoretical analysis for convergence is
then made possible in this setting, the difficulty of which sits between that of single-agent
RL and general MARL algorithms. Three different information structures are depicted in
Figure 2.
4 MARL Algorithms with Theory
This section provides a selective review of MARL algorithms, and categorizes them ac-
cording to the tasks to address. Exclusively, we review here the works that are focused
on the theoretical studies only, which are mostly built upon the two representative MARL
frameworks, fully observed Markov games and extensive-form games, introduced in §2.2.
A brief summary on MARL for partially observed Markov games in cooperative settings,
namely, the Dec-POMDP problems, is also provided below in §4.1, due to their relatively
more mature theory than that of MARL for general partially observed Markov games.
4.1 Cooperative Setting
Cooperative MARL constitutes a great portion of MARL settings, where all agents collab-
orate with each other to achieve some shared goal. Most cooperative MARL algorithms
backed by theoretical analysis are devised for the following more specific settings.
15
4.1.1 Homogeneous Agents
A majority of cooperative MARL settings involve homogeneous agents with a common re-
ward function that aligns all agents’ interests. In the extreme case with large populations
of agents, such a homogeneity also indicates that the agents play an interchangeable role
in the system evolution, and can hardly be distinguished from each other. We elaborate
more on homogeneity below.
Multi-Agent MDP & Markov Teams
Consider a Markov game as in Definition 2.2 with R1 = R2 = · · · = RN = R, where the
reward R : S ×A×S →R is influenced by the joint action in A =A1× · · · ×AN . As a result,
the Q-function is identical for all agents. Hence, a straightforward algorithm proceeds by
performing the standard Q-learning update (2.1) at each agent, but taking the max over
the joint action space a′ ∈ A. Convergence to the optimal/equilibrium Q-function has
been established in Szepesva´ri and Littman (1999); Littman (2001), when both state and
action spaces are finite.
However, convergence of the Q-function does not necessarily imply that of the equi-
librium policy for the Markov team, as any combination of equilibrium policies extracted
at each agent may not constitute an equilibrium policy, if the equilibrium policies are
non-unique, and the agents fail to agree on which one to select. Hence, convergence to the
NE policy is only guaranteed if either the equilibrium is assumed to be unique (Littman,
2001), or the agents are coordinated for equilibrium selection. The latter idea has first
been validated in the cooperative repeated games setting (Claus and Boutilier, 1998), a
special case of Markov teams with a singleton state, where the agents are joint-action
learners (JAL), maintaining a Q-value for joint actions, and learning empirical models
of all others. Convergence to equilibrium point is claimed in Claus and Boutilier (1998),
without a formal proof. For the actual Markov teams, this coordination has been exploited
in Wang and Sandholm (2003), which proposes optimal adaptive learning (OAL), the first
MARL algorithm with provable convergence to the equilibrium policy. Specifically, OAL
first learns the game structure, and constructs virtual games at each state that are weakly
acyclic with respect to (w.r.t.) a biased set. OAL can be shown to converge to the NE, by in-
troducing the biased adaptive play learning algorithm for the constructed weakly acyclic
games, motivated from Young (1993).
Apart from equilibrium selection, another subtlety special to Markov teams (com-
pared to single-agent RL) is the necessity to address the scalability issue, see §3.3. As
independent Q-learning may fail to converge (Tan, 1993), one early attempt toward devel-
oping scalable while convergent algorithms for MMDPs is Lauer and Riedmiller (2000),
which advocates a distributed Q-learning algorithm that converges for deterministic fi-
nite MMDPs. Each agent maintains only a Q-table of state s and local action ai , and
successively takes maximization over the joint action a′. No other agent’s actions and
their histories can be acquired by each individual agent. Several other heuristics (with
no theoretical backing) regarding either reward or value function factorization have been
proposed to mitigate the scalability issue (Guestrin et al., 2002a,b; Kok and Vlassis, 2004;
Sunehag et al., 2018; Rashid et al., 2018). Very recently, Son et al. (2019) provides a rig-
orous characterization of conditions that justify this value factorization idea. Another
recent theoretical work along this direction is Qu and Li (2019), which imposes a spe-
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cial dependence structure, i.e., a one-directional tree, so that the (near-)optimal policy of
the overall MMDP can be provably well-approximated by local policies. Yongacoglu et al.
(2019) has studied common interest games, which includes Markov teams as an exam-
ple, and develops a decentralized RL algorithm that relies on only states, local actions and
rewards. With the same information structure as independent Q-learning (Tan, 1993),
the algorithm is guaranteed to converge to team optimal equilibrium policies, and not just
equilibrium policies. This is important as in general, a suboptimal equilibrium can per-
form arbitrarily worse than the optimal equilibrium (Yongacoglu et al., 2019).
For policy-based methods, to our knowledge, the only convergence guarantee for this
setting exists in Perolat et al. (2018). The authors propose two-timescale actor-critic fic-
titious play algorithms, where at the slower timescale, the actor mixes the current policy
and the best-response one w.r.t. the local Q-value estimate, while at the faster timescale
the critic performs policy evaluation, as if all agents’ policies are stationary. Convergence
is established for simultaneous move multistage games with a common (also zero-sum, see
§4.2.2) reward, a special Markov team with initial and absorbing states, and each state
being visited only once.
Markov Potential Games
From a game-theoretic perspective, a more general framework to embrace coopera-
tion is potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996), where there exits some potential
function shared by all agents, such that if any agent changes its policy unilaterally, the
change in its reward equals (or proportions to) that in the potential function. Though
most potential games are stateless, an extension named Markov potential games (MPGs) has
gained increasing attention for modeling sequential decision-making (Gonza´lez-Sa´nchez
and Herna´ndez-Lerma, 2013; Zazo et al., 2016), which includes Markovian states whose
evolution is affected by the joint actions. Indeed, MMDPs/Markov teams constitute a
particular case of MPGs, with the potential function being the common reward; such dy-
namic games can also be viewed as being strategically equivalent to Markov teams, using
the terminology in, e.g., (Bas¸ar and Zaccour, 2018, Chapter 1). Under this model, Valcar-
cel Macua et al. (2018) provides verifiable conditions for a Markov game to be an MPG,
and shows the equivalence between finding closed-loop NE in MPG and solving a single-
agent optimal control problem. Hence, single-agent RL algorithms are then enabled to
solve this MARL problem.
Mean-Field Regime
Another idea toward tackling the scalability issue is to take the setting to the mean-
field regime, with an extremely large number of homogeneous agents. Each agent’s effect
on the overall multi-agent system can thus become infinitesimal, resulting in all agents
being interchangeable/indistinguishable. The interaction with other agents, however, is
captured simply by some mean-field quantity, e.g., the average state, or the empirical
distribution of states. Each agent only needs to find the best response to the mean-field,
which considerably simplifies the analysis. This mean-field view of multi-agent systems
has been approached by the mean-field games (MFGs) model (Huang et al., 2003, 2006;
Lasry and Lions, 2007; Bensoussan et al., 2013; Tembine et al., 2013), the team model
with mean-field sharing (Arabneydi and Mahajan, 2014; Arabneydi, 2017), and the game
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model with mean-field actions (Yang et al., 2018).4
MARL in these models have not been explored until recently, mostly in the non-
cooperative setting of MFGs, see §4.3 for a more detailed review. Regarding the coop-
erative setting, recent work Subramanian et al. (2018) studies RL for Markov teams with
mean-field sharing (Arabneydi and Mahajan, 2014, 2016; Arabneydi, 2017). Compared to
MFG, the model considers agents that share a common reward function depending only
on the local state and the mean-field, which encourages cooperation among the agents.
Also, the term mean-field refers to the empirical average for the states of finite population,
in contrast to the expectation and probability distribution of infinite population in MFGs.
Based on the dynamic programming decomposition for the specified model (Arabneydi
and Mahajan, 2014), several popular RL algorithms are easily translated to address this
setting (Subramanian et al., 2018). More recently, Carmona et al. (2019a,b) approach the
problem from a mean-field control (MFC) model, to model large-population of coopera-
tive decision-makers. Policy gradient methods are proved to converge for linear quadratic
MFCs in Carmona et al. (2019a), and mean-field Q-learning is then shown to converge for
general MFCs (Carmona et al., 2019b).
4.1.2 Decentralized Paradigm with Networked Agents
Cooperative agents in numerous practical multi-agent systems are not always homoge-
neous. Agents may have different preferences, i.e., reward functions, while still form
a team to maximize the return of the team-average reward R¯, where R¯(s,a, s′) = N−1 ·∑
i∈N Ri(s,a, s′). More subtly, the reward function is sometimes not sharable with others,
as the preference is kept private to each agent. This setting finds broad applications in en-
gineering systems as sensor networks (Rabbat and Nowak, 2004), smart grid (Dall’Anese
et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2018a), intelligent transportation systems (Adler and Blue, 2002;
Zhang et al., 2018b), and robotics (Corke et al., 2005).
Covering the homogeneous setting in §4.1.1 as a special case, the specified one defi-
nitely requires more coordination, as, for example, the global value function cannot be
estimated locally without knowing other agents’ reward functions. With a central con-
troller, most MARL algorithms reviewed in §4.1.1 directly apply, since the controller can
collect and average the rewards, and distributes the information to all agents. Nonethe-
less, such a controller may not exist in most aforementioned applications, due to either
cost, scalability, or robustness concerns (Rabbat and Nowak, 2004; Dall’Anese et al., 2013;
Zhang et al., 2019). Instead, the agents may be able to share/exchange information with
their neighbors over a possibly time-varying and sparse communication network, as il-
lustrated in Figure 2 (b). Though MARL under this decentralized/distributed5 paradigm
is imperative, it is relatively less-investigated, in comparison to the extensive results on
distributed/consensus algorithms that solve static/one-stage optimization problems (Nedic
4The difference between mean-field teams and mean-field games is mainly the solution concept: op-
timum versus equilibrium, as the difference between general dynamic team theory (Witsenhausen, 1971;
Yoshikawa, 1978; Yu¨ksel and Bas¸ar, 2013) and game theory (Shapley, 1953; Filar and Vrieze, 2012). Al-
though the former can be viewed as a special case of the latter, related works are usually reviewed separately
in the literature. We follow here this convention.
5Note that hereafter we use decentralized and distributed interchangeably for describing this paradigm.
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and Ozdaglar, 2009; Agarwal and Duchi, 2011; Jakovetic et al., 2011; Tu and Sayed, 2012),
which, unlike RL, involves no system dynamics, and does not maximize the long-term ob-
jective in a sequential fashion.
Learning Optimal Policy
The most significant goal is to learn the optimal joint policy, while each agent only
accesses to local and neighboring information over the network. The idea of MARL with
networked agents dates back to Varshavskaya et al. (2009). To our knowledge, the first
provably convergent MARL algorithm under this setting is due to Kar et al. (2013), which
incorporates the idea of consensus + innovation to the standard Q-learning algorithm,
yielding the QD-learning algorithm with the following update
Qit+1(s,a)←Qit(s,a) +αt,s,a
[
Ri(s,a) +γmin
a′∈A
Qit(s
′, a′)−Qit(s,a)
]
− βt,s,a
∑
j∈N it
[
Qit(s,a)−Qjt (s,a)
]
,
where αt,s,a, βt,s,a > 0 are stepsizes, N it denotes the set of neighboring agents of agent i,
at time t. Compared to the Q-learning update (2.1), QD-learning appends an innovation
term that captures the difference of Q-value estimates from its neighbors. With certain
conditions on the stepsizes, the algorithm is guaranteed to converge to the optimum Q-
function for the tabular setting.
Due to the scalability issue, function approximation is vital in MARL, which necessi-
tates the development of policy-based algorithms. Our work Zhang et al. (2018) proposes
actor-critic algorithms for this setting. Particularly, each agent parameterizes its own pol-
icy pii
θi
: S → Ai by some parameter θi ∈ Rmi , the policy gradient of the return is first
derived as
∇θi J(θ) = E
[
∇θi logpiiθi (s,ai) ·Qθ(s,a)
]
(4.1)
where Qθ is the global value function corresponding to R¯ under the joint policy piθ that
is defined as piθ(a |s) := ∏i∈N piiθi (ai |s). As an analogy to (2.2), the policy gradient in (4.1)
involves the expectation of the product between the local score function ∇θi logpiiθi (s,ai)
and the global Q-function Qθ. The latter, nonetheless, cannot be estimated individually
at each agent. As a result, by parameterizing each local copy of Qθ(·, ·) as Qθ(·, ·;ωi) for
agent i, we propose the following consensus-based TD learning for the critic step, i.e., for
estimating Qθ(·, ·):
ω˜it =ω
i
t + βω,t · δit · ∇ωQt(ωit), ωit+1 =
∑
j∈N
ct(i, j) · ω˜jt , (4.2)
where βω,t > 0 is the stepsize, δ
i
t is the local TD-error calculated using Qθ(·, ·;ωi). The first
relation in (4.2) performs the standard TD update, followed by a weighted combination of
the neighbors’ estimates ω˜jt . The weights here, ct(i, j), are dictated by the topology of the
communication network, with non-zero values only if two agents i and j are connected
at time t. They also need to satisfy the doubly stochastic property in expectation, so that
ωit reaches a consensual value for all i ∈ N if it converges. Then, each agent i updates its
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policy following stochastic policy gradient given by (4.1) in the actor step, using its own Q-
function estimateQθ(·, ·;ωit). A variant algorithm is also introduced in Zhang et al. (2018),
relying on not the Q-function, but the state-value function approximation, to estimate the
global advantage function.
With these in mind, almost sure convergence is established in Zhang et al. (2018) for
these decentralized actor-critic algorithms, when linear functions are used for value func-
tion approximation. Similar ideas are also extended to the setting with continuous spaces
(Zhang et al., 2018a), where deterministic policy gradient (DPG) method is usually used.
Off-policy exploration, namely a stochastic behavior policy, is required for DPG, as the
deterministic on-policy may not be explorative enough. However, in the multi-agent set-
ting, as the policies of other agents are unknown, the common off-policy approach for
DPG (Silver et al., 2014, §4.2) does not apply. Inspired by the expected policy gradient
(EPG) method (Ciosek and Whiteson, 2018) which unifies stochastic PG (SPG) and DPG,
we develop an algorithm that remains on-policy, but reduces the variance of general SPG
(Zhang et al., 2018a). In particular, we derive the multi-agent version of EPG, based on
which we develop the actor step that can be implemented in a decentralized fashion, while
the critic step still follows (4.2). Convergence of the algorithm is then also guaranteed
when linear function approximation is used (Zhang et al., 2018a). In the same vein, Suttle
et al. (2019) considers the extension of Zhang et al. (2018) to an off-policy setting, build-
ing upon the emphatic temporal differences (ETD) method for the critic (Sutton et al.,
2016). By incorporating the analysis of ETD(λ) (Yu, 2015) into Zhang et al. (2018), almost
sure convergence guarantee has also been established. Another off-policy algorithm for
the same setting is proposed concurrently by Zhang and Zavlanos (2019), where agents
do not share their estimates of value function. Instead, the agents aim to reach consensus
over the global optimal policy estimation. Provable convergence is then established for
the algorithm, with a local critic and a consensus actor.
RL for decentralized networked agents has also been investigated in multi-task, in addi-
tion to the multi-agent, settings. In some sense, the former can be regarded as a simplified
version of the latter, where each agent deals with an independent MDP that is not affected
by other agents, while the goal is still to learn the optimal joint policy that accounts for the
average reward of all agents. Pennesi and Paschalidis (2010) proposes a distributed actor-
critic algorithm, assuming that the states, actions, and rewards are all local to each agent.
Each agent performs a local TD-based critic step, followed by a consensus-based actor
step that follows the gradient calculated using information exchanged from the neighbors.
Gradient of the average return is then proved to converge to zero as the iteration goes to
infinity. Macua et al. (2017) has developed Diff-DAC, another distributed actor-critic al-
gorithm for this setting, from duality theory. The updates resemble those in Zhang et al.
(2018), but provide additional insights that actor-critic is actually an instance of the dual
ascent method for solving a linear program.
Note that all the aforementioned convergence guarantees are asymptotic, i.e., the algo-
rithms converge as the iteration numbers go to infinity, and are restricted to the case with
linear function approximations. This fails to quantify the performance when finite iter-
ations and/or samples are used, not to mention when nonlinear functions such as deep
neural networks are utilized. As an initial step toward finite-sample analyses in this setting
with more general function approximation, we consider in Zhang et al. (2018b) the batch
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RL algorithms (Lange et al., 2012), specifically, decentralized variants of the fitted-Q it-
eration (FQI) (Riedmiller, 2005; Antos et al., 2008). Note that we focus on FQI since it
motivates the celebrated deep Q-learning algorithm (Mnih et al., 2015) when deep neural
networks are used. We study FQI variants for both the cooperative setting with networked
agents, and the competitive setting with two teams of such networked agents (see §4.2.1
for more details). In the former setting, all agents cooperate to iteratively update the
global Q-function estimate, by fitting nonlinear least squares with the target values as
the responses. In particular, let F be the function class for Q-function approximation,
{(sj , {aij}i∈N , s′j)}j∈[n] be the batch transitions dataset of size n available to all agents, {r ij }j∈[n]
be the local reward samples private to each agent, and yij = r
i
j + γ ·maxa∈AQit(s′j , a) be the
local target value, where Qit is agent i’s Q-function estimate at iteration t. Then, all agents
cooperate to find a common Q-function estimate by solving
min
f ∈F
1
N
∑
i∈N
1
2n
n∑
j=1
[
yij − f (sj , a1j , · · · , aNj )
]2
. (4.3)
Since yij is only known to agent i, the problem in (4.3) aligns with the formulation of dis-
tributed/consensus optimization in Nedic and Ozdaglar (2009); Agarwal and Duchi (2011);
Jakovetic et al. (2011); Tu and Sayed (2012); Hong and Chang (2017); Nedic et al. (2017),
whose global optimal solution can be achieved by the algorithms therein, if F makes∑n
j=1[y
i
j − f (sj , a1j , · · · , aNj )]2 convex for each i. This is indeed the case if F is a linear func-
tion class. Nevertheless, with only a finite iteration of distributed optimization algorithms
(common in practice), agents may not reach exact consensus, leading to an error of each
agent’s Q-function estimate away from the actual optimum of (4.3). Such an error also
exists when nonlinear function approximation is used. Considering this error caused
by decentralized computation, we follow the error propagation analysis stemming from
single-agent batch RL (Munos, 2007; Antos et al., 2008; Munos and Szepesva´ri, 2008; An-
tos et al., 2008; Farahmand et al., 2010), to establish the finite-sample performance of the
proposed algorithms, i.e., how accuracy of the algorithms output depends on the function
class F , the number of samples within each iteration n, and the number of iterations for
t.
Policy Evaluation
Aside from control, a series of algorithms in this setting focuses on the policy evalua-
tion task only, namely, the critic step of the actor-critic algorithms. With the policy fixed,
this task embraces a neater formulation, as the sampling distribution becomes stationary,
and the objective becomes convex under linear function approximation. This facilitates
the finite-time/sample analyses, in contrast to most control algorithms with only asymp-
totic guarantees. Specifically, under joint policy pi, suppose each agent parameterizes
the value function by a linear function class {Vω(s) := φ>(s)ω : ω ∈ Rd}, where φ(s) ∈ Rd
is the feature vector at s ∈ S , and ω ∈ Rd is the vector of parameters. For notational
convenience, let Φ := (· · · ;φ>(s); · · · ) ∈ R|S|×d , D = diag[{ηpi(s)}s∈S ] ∈ R|S|×|S| be a diago-
nal matrix constructed using the state-occupancy measure ηpi, R¯pi(s) = N−1 ·∑i∈N Ri,pi(s),
where Ri,pi(s) = Ea∼pi(· |s),s′∼P (· |s,a)[Ri(s,a, s′)], and P pi ∈ R|S|×|S| with the (s, s′) element being
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[P pi]s,s′ =
∑
a∈Api(a |s)P (s′ |s,a). The objective of all agents is to jointly minimize the mean
square projected Bellman error (MSPBE) associated with the team-average reward, i.e.,
min
ω
MSPBE(ω) :=
∥∥∥ΠΦ(Vω −γP piVω − R¯pi)∥∥∥2D = ∥∥∥Aω − b∥∥∥2C−1 , (4.4)
where ΠΦ : R|S| → R|S| defined as ΠΦ := Φ(Φ>DΦ)−1Φ>D is the projection operator
onto subspace {Φω : ω ∈ Rd}, A := E{φ(s)[φ(s) − γφ(s′)]>}, C := E[φ(s)φ>(s)], and b :=
E[R¯pi(s)φ(s)]. By replacing the expectation with samples and using the Fenchel duality,
the finite-sum version of (4.4) can be re-formulated as a distributed saddle-point problem
min
ω
max
λi ,i∈N
1
Nn
∑
i∈N
n∑
j=1
2(λi)>Ajω − 2(bij)>λi − (λi)>Cjλi (4.5)
where n is the data size,Aj ,Cj and b
i
j are empirical estimates ofA,C and b
i := E[Ri,pi(s)φ(s)],
respectively, using sample j. Note that (4.5) is convex in ω and concave in {λi}i∈N . The
use of MSPBE as an objective is standard in multi-agent policy evaluation (Macua et al.,
2015; Lee et al., 2018; Wai et al., 2018; Doan et al., 2019), and the idea of saddle-point
reformulation has been adopted in Macua et al. (2015); Lee et al. (2018); Wai et al. (2018);
Cassano et al. (2018). Note that in Cassano et al. (2018), a variant of MSPBE, named H-
truncated λ-weighted MSPBE, is advocated, in order to control the bias of the solution
deviated from the actual mean square Bellman error minimizer.
With the formulation (4.4) in mind, Lee et al. (2018) develops a distributed variant of
the gradient TD-based method, with asymptotic convergence established using the ordi-
nary differential equation (ODE) method. In Wai et al. (2018), a double averaging scheme
that combines the dynamic consensus (Qu and Li, 2017) and the SAG algorithm (Schmidt
et al., 2017) has been proposed to solve the saddle-point problem (4.5) with linear rate.
Cassano et al. (2018) incorporates the idea of variance-reduction, specifically, AVRG in
(Ying et al., 2018), into gradient TD-based policy evaluation. Achieving the same lin-
ear rate as Wai et al. (2018), three advantages are claimed in Cassano et al. (2018): i)
data-independent memory requirement; ii) use of eligibility traces (Singh and Sutton,
1996); iii) no need for synchronization in sampling. More recently, standard TD learning
(Tesauro, 1995), instead of gradient-TD, has been generalized to this MARL setting, with
special focuses on finite-sample analyses, see Doan et al. (2019) and Doan et al. (2019).
Distributed TD(0) is first studied in Doan et al. (2019), using the proof techniques origi-
nated in Bhandari et al. (2018), which requires a projection on the iterates, and the data
samples to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Furthermore, motivated by
the recent progress in Srikant and Ying (2019), finite-time performance of the more gen-
eral distributed TD(λ) algorithm is provided in Doan et al. (2019), with neither projection
nor i.i.d. noise assumption needed.
Policy evaluation for networked agents has also been investigated under the setting of
independent agents interacting with independent MDPs. Macua et al. (2015) studies off-
policy evaluation based on the importance sampling technique. With no coupling among
MDPs, an agent does not need to know the actions of the other agents. Diffusion-based
distributed GTD is then proposed, and is shown to convergence in the mean-square sense
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with a sublinear rate. In Stankovic´ and Stankovic´ (2016), two variants of the TD-learning,
namely, GTD2 and TDC (Sutton et al., 2009), have been designed for this setting, with
weak convergence proved by the general stochastic approximation theory in Stankovic´
et al. (2016), when agents are connected by a time-varying communication network. Note
that Cassano et al. (2018) also considers the independent MDP setting, with the same
results established as the actual MARL setting.
Other Learning Goals
Several other learning goals have also been explored for decentralized MARL with net-
worked agents. Zhang et al. (2016) has considered the optimal consensus problem, where
each agent over the network tracks the states of its neighbors’ as well as a leader’s, so that
the consensus error is minimized by the joint policy. A policy iteration algorithm is then
introduced, followed by a practical actor-critic algorithm using neural networks for func-
tion approximation. A similar consensus error objective is also adopted in Zhang et al.
(2018), under the name of cooperative multi-agent graphical games. A centralized-critic-
decentralized-actor scheme is utilized for developing off-policy RL algorithms.
Communication efficiency, as a key ingredient in the algorithm design for this setting,
has drawn increasing attention recently (Chen et al., 2018; Ren and Haupt, 2019; Lin
et al., 2019). Specifically, Chen et al. (2018) develops Lazily Aggregated Policy Gradient
(LAPG), a distributed PG algorithm that can reduce the communication rounds between
the agents and a central controller, by judiciously designing communication trigger rules.
Ren and Haupt (2019) addresses the same policy evaluation problem as Wai et al. (2018),
and develops a hierarchical distributed algorithm by proposing a mixing matrix different
from the doubly stochastic one used in Zhang et al. (2018); Wai et al. (2018); Lee et al.
(2018), which allows unidirectional information exchange among agents to save commu-
nication. In contrast, the distributed actor-critic algorithm in Lin et al. (2019) reduces the
communication by transmitting only one scaled entry of its state vector at each iteration,
while preserving provable convergence as in Zhang et al. (2018).
4.1.3 Partially Observed Model
We complete the overview for cooperative settings by briefly introducing a class of signif-
icant but challenging models where agents are faced with partial observability. Though
common in practice, theoretical analysis of algorithms in this setting is still in its infancy,
in contrast to the aforementioned fully observed settings. In general, this setting can be
modeled by a decentralized POMDP (Dec-POMDP) (Oliehoek and Amato, 2016), which
shares almost all elements such as the reward function and the transition model, as the
MMDP/Markov team model in §2.2.1, except that each agent now only has its local ob-
servations of the system state s. With no accessibility to other agents’ observations, an
individual agent cannot maintain a global belief state, the sufficient statistic for decision
making in single-agent POMDPs. Hence, Dec-POMDPs have been known to be NEXP-
hard (Bernstein et al., 2002), requiring super-exponential time to solve in the worst case.
There is an increasing interest in developing planning/learning algorithms for Dec-
POMDPs. Most of the algorithms are based on a centralized-learning-decentralized-execution
scheme. In particular, the decentralized problem is first reformulated as a centralized
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one, which can be solved at a central controller with (a simulator that generates) the ob-
servation data of all agents. The policies are then optimized/learned using data, and
distributed to all agents for execution. Finite-state controllers (FSCs) are commonly used
to represent the local policy at each agent (Bernstein et al., 2009; Amato et al., 2010),
which map local observation histories to actions. A Bayesian nonparametric approach is
proposed in Liu et al. (2015) to determine the controller size of variable-size FSCs. To
efficiently solve the centralized problem, a series of top-down algorithms have been pro-
posed. In Oliehoek and Amato (2014), the Dec-POMDP is converted to non-observable
MDP (NOMDP), a kind of centralized sequential decision-making problem, which is then
addressed by some heuristic tree search algorithms. As an extension of the NOMDP con-
version, Dibangoye et al. (2016); Dibangoye and Buffet (2018) convert Dec-POMDPs to
occupancy-state MDPs (oMDPs), where the occupancy-states are distributions over hid-
den states and joint histories of observations. As the value functions of oMDPs enjoy the
piece-wise linearity and convexity, both tractable planning (Dibangoye et al., 2016) and
value-based learning (Dibangoye and Buffet, 2018) algorithms have been developed.
To further improve computational efficiency, several sampling-based planning/learning
algorithms have also been proposed. In particular, Monte-Carlo sampling with policy it-
eration and the expectation-maximization algorithm, are proposed in Wu et al. (2010) and
Wu et al. (2013), respectively. Furthermore, Monte-Carlo tree search has been applied
to special classes of Dec-POMDPs, such as multi-agent POMDPs (Amato and Oliehoek,
2015) and multi-robot active perception (Best et al., 2018). In addition, policy gradient-
based algorithms can also be developed for this centralized learning scheme (Dibangoye
and Buffet, 2018), with a centralized critic and a decentralized actor. Finite-sample anal-
ysis can also be established under this scheme (Amato and Zilberstein, 2009; Banerjee
et al., 2012), for tabular settings with finite state-action spaces.
Several attempts have also been made to enable decentralized learning in Dec-POMDPs.
When the agents share some common information/observations, Nayyar et al. (2013) pro-
poses to reformulate the problem as a centralized POMDP, with the common information
being the observations of a virtual central controller. This way, the centralized POMDP
can be solved individually by each agent. In Arabneydi and Mahajan (2015), the reformu-
lated POMDP has been approximated by finite-state MDPs with exponentially decreasing
approximation error, which are then solved by Q-learning. Very recently, Zhang et al.
(2019) has developed a tree-search based algorithm for solving this centralized POMDP,
which, interestingly, echoes back the heuristics for solving Dec-POMDPs directly as in
Amato and Oliehoek (2015); Best et al. (2018), but with a more solid theoretical footing.
Note that in both Arabneydi and Mahajan (2015) and Zhang et al. (2019), a common ran-
dom number generator is used for all agents, in order to avoid communication among
agents and enable a decentralized learning scheme.
4.2 Competitive Setting
Competitive settings are usually modeled as zero-sum games. Computationally, there ex-
ists a great barrier between solving two-player and multi-player zero-sum games. In par-
ticular, even the simplest three-player matrix games, are known to be PPAD-complete
(Papadimitriou, 1992; Daskalakis et al., 2009). Thus, most existing results on competitive
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MARL focus on two-player zero-sum games, with N = {1,2} and R1 + R2 = 0 in Defi-
nitions 2.2 and 2.4. In the rest of this section, we review methods that provably find
a Nash (equivalently, saddle-point) equilibrium in two-player Markov or extensive-form
games. The existing algorithms can mainly be categorized into two classes: value-based
and policy-based approaches, which are introduced separately in the sequel.
4.2.1 Value-Based Methods
Similar to the MDPs, value-based methods aim to find an optimal value function from
which the joint Nash equilibrium policy can be extracted. Moreover, the optimal value
function is known to be the unique fixed point of a Bellman operator, which can be ob-
tained via dynamic programming type methods.
Specifically, for simultaneous-move Markov games, the value function defined in (2.3)
satisfies V 1
pi1,pi2
= −V 2
pi1,pi2
. and thus any Nash equilibrium pi∗ = (pi1,∗,pi2,∗) satisfies
V 1pi1,pi1,∗(s) ≤ V 1pi1,∗,pi2,∗(s) ≤ V 1pi1,∗,pi2(s), for any pi = (pi1,pi2) and s ∈ S . (4.6)
By the Von Neumann minimax theorem (Von Neumann et al., 2007), we define the optimal
value function V ∗ : S →R as
V ∗ = max
pi1
min
pi2
V 1pi1,pi2 = minpi2
max
pi1
V 1pi1,pi2 , (4.7)
Then (4.6) implies that V 1
pi1,∗,pi2,∗ coincides with V
∗ and any pair of policies pi1 and pi2
that attains the supremum and infimum in (4.7) constitutes a Nash equilibrium. More-
over, similar to MDPs, Shapley (1953) shows that V ∗ is the unique solution of a Bellman
equation and a Nash equilibrium can be constructed based on V ∗. Specifically, for any
V : S →R and any s ∈ S , we define
QV (s,a
1, a2) = Es′∼P (· |s,a1,a2)
[
R1(s,a1, a2, s′) +γ ·V (s′)
]
, (4.8)
which is regarded as a matrix in R|A1|×|A2|. Then we define the Bellman operator T ∗ by
solving a matrix zero-sum game regardingQV (s, ·, ·) as the payoffmatrix, i.e., for any s ∈ S ,
we define
(T ∗V )(s) = Value
[
QV (s, ·, ·)
]
= max
u∈∆(A1)
min
v∈∆(A2)
∑
a∈A1
∑
b∈A2
ua · vb ·QV (s,a,b), (4.9)
where we use Value(·) to denote the optimal value of a matrix zero-sum game, which
can be obtained by solving a linear program (Vanderbei et al., 2015). Thus, the Bell-
man operator T ∗ is γ-contractive in the `∞-norm and V ∗ in (4.7) is the unique solution
to the Bellman equation V = T ∗V . Moreover, letting p1(V ),p2(V ) be any solution to the
optimization problem in (4.9), we have that pi∗ = (p1(V ∗),p2(V ∗)) is a Nash equilibrium
specified by Definition 2.3. Thus, based on the Bellman operator T ∗, Shapley (1953) pro-
poses the value iteration algorithm, which creates a sequence of value functions {Vt}t≥1
satisfying Vt+1 = T ∗Vt, which converges to V ∗ with a linear rate. Specifically, we have
‖Vt+1 −V ∗‖∞ = ‖T ∗Vt −T ∗V ∗‖∞ ≤ γ · ‖Vt −V ∗‖∞ ≤ γ t+1 · ‖V0 −V ∗‖∞.
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In addition, a value iteration update can be decomposed into the two steps. In particu-
lar, letting pi1 be any policy of player 1 and V be any value function, we define Bellman
operator T pi1 by
(T pi1V )(s) = min
v∈∆(A2)
∑
a∈A1
∑
b∈A2
pi1(a |s) · vb ·QV (s,a,b), (4.10)
where QV is defined in (4.8). Then we can equivalently write a value iteration update as
µt+1 = p1(Vt) and Vt+1 = T µt+1Vt. (4.11)
Such a decomposition motivates the policy iteration algorithm for two-player zero-sum
games, which has been studied in, e.g., Hoffman and Karp (1966); Van Der Wal (1978);
Rao et al. (1973); Patek (1997); Hansen et al. (2013). In particular, from the perspective of
player 1, policy iteration creates a sequence {µt,Vt}t≥0 satisfying
µt+1 = p1(Vt) and Vt+1 = (T µt+1)∞Vt, (4.12)
i.e., Vt+1 is the fixed point of T µt+1 . The updates for player 2 can be similarly constructed.
By the definition in (4.10), the Bellman operator T µt+1 is γ-contractive and its fixed point
corresponds to the value function associated with (µt+1,Br(µt+1)), where Br(µt+1) is the
best response policy of player 2 when the first player adopts µt+1. Hence, in each step
of policy iteration, the player first finds an improved policy µt+1 based on the current
function Vt, and then obtains a conservative value function by assuming that the opponent
plays the best counter policy Br(µt+1). It has been shown in Hansen et al. (2013) that
the value function sequence {Vt}t≥0 monotonically increases to V ∗ with a linear rate of
convergence.
Notice that both the value and policy iteration algorithms are model-based due to the
need of computing the Bellman operator T µt+1 in (4.11) and (4.12). By estimating the
Bellman operator via data-driven approximation, Littman (1994) has proposed minimax-
Q learning, which extends the well-known Q-learning algorithm (Watkins and Dayan,
1992) for MDPs to zero-sum Markov games. In particular, minimax-Q learning is an
online, off-policy, and tabular method which updates the action-value functionQ : S×A→
R based on transition data {(st, at, rt, s′t)}t≥0, where s′t is the next state following (st, at) and
rt is the reward. In the t-th iteration, it only updates the value of Q(st, at) and keeps other
entries of Q unchanged. Specifically, we have
Q(st, a
1
t , a
2
t )← (1−αt) ·Q(st, a1t , a2t ) +αt ·
{
rt +γ · Value
[
Q(s′t, ·, ·)
]}
, (4.13)
where αt ∈ (0,1) is the stepsize. As shown in Szepesva´ri and Littman (1999), under con-
ditions similar to those for single-agent Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992), function
Q generated by (4.13) converges to the optimal action-value function Q∗ =QV ∗ defined in
(4.8). Moreover, with a slight abuse of notation, if we define the Bellman operator T ∗ for
action-value functions by
(T ∗Q)(s,a1, a2) = Es′∼P (· |s,a1,a2)
{
R1(s,a1, a2, s′) +γ ·Value
[
Q(s′, ·, ·)
]}
, (4.14)
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then we haveQ∗ as the unique fixed point of T ∗. Since the target value rt+γ ·Value[Q(s′t, ·, ·)]
in (4.13) is an unbiased estimator of (T ∗Q)(st, a1t , a2t ), minimax-Q learning can be viewed
as a stochastic approximation algorithm for computing the fixed point of T ∗. Following
Littman (1994), minimax-Q learning has been further extended to the function approx-
imation setting where Q in (4.13) is approximated by a class of parametrized functions.
In particular, Lagoudakis and Parr (2002); Zou et al. (2019) establish the convergence
of minimax-Q learning with linear function approximation and temporal-difference up-
dates (Sutton and Barto, 1987). Such a linear value function approximation also applies to
a significant class of zero-sum MG instances with continuous state-action spaces, i.e., lin-
ear quadratic (LQ) zero-sum games (Bas¸ar and Bernhard, 1995; Al-Tamimi et al., 2007a,b),
where the reward function is quadratic with respect to the states and actions, while the
transition model follows linear dynamics. In this setting, Q-learning based algorithm can
be guaranteed to converge to the NE (Al-Tamimi et al., 2007b).
To embrace general function classes, the framework of batch RL (Munos, 2007; Antos
et al., 2008; Munos and Szepesva´ri, 2008; Antos et al., 2008; Farahmand et al., 2016) can
be adapted to the multi-agent settings, as in the recent works Yang et al. (2019); Zhang
et al. (2018b). As mentioned in §4.1.2 for cooperative batch MARL, each agent iteratively
updates the Q-function by fitting least-squares using the target values. Specifically, let F
be the function class of interest and let {(si , a1i , a2i , ri , s′i)}i∈[n] be the dataset. For any t ≥ 0,
let Qt be the current iterate in the t-th iteration, and define yi = ri +γ ·Value[Qt(s′i , ·, ·)] for
all i ∈ [n]. Then we update Qt by solving a least-squares regression problem in F , that is,
Qt+1← argmin
f ∈F
1
2n
n∑
i=1
[
yi − f (si , a1i , a2i )
]2
. (4.15)
In such a two-player zero-sum Markov game setting, a finite-sample error bound on the
Q-function estimate is established in Yang et al. (2019).
Regarding other finite-sample analyses, very recently, Jia et al. (2019) has studied zero-
sum turn-based stochastic games (TBSG), a simplified zero-sum MG when the transition
model is embedded in some feature space and a generative model is available. Two Q-
learning based algorithms have been proposed and analyzed for this setting. Sidford et al.
(2019) has proposed algorithms that achieve near-optimal sample complexity for general
zero-sum TBSGs with a generative model, by extending the previous near-optimal Q-
learning algorithm for MDPs in Sidford et al. (2018). In the online setting, where the
learner controls only one of the players that plays against an arbitrary opponent, Wei
et al. (2017) has proposed UCSG, an algorithm for the average-reward zero-sum MGs, using
the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty (Auer and Ortner, 2007; Jaksch et al.,
2010). UCSG is shown to achieve a sublinear regret compared to the game value when
competing with an arbitrary opponent, and also achieve O˜(poly(1/)) sample complexity
if the opponent plays an optimistic best response.
Furthermore, when it comes to zero-sum games with imperfect information, Koller
et al. (1994); Von Stengel (1996); Koller et al. (1996); Von Stengel (2002) have proposed
to transform extensive-form games into normal-form games using the sequence form rep-
resentation, which enables equilibrium finding via linear programming. In addition, by
lifting the state space to the space of belief states, Parr and Russell (1995); Rodriguez
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et al. (2000); Hauskrecht (2000); Hansen et al. (2004); Buter (2012) have applied dynamic
programming methods to zero-sum stochastic games. Both of these approaches guaran-
tee finding of a Nash equilibrium but are only efficient for small-scale problems. Finally,
MCTS with UCB-type action selection rule (Chang et al., 2005; Kocsis and Szepesva´ri,
2006; Coulom, 2006) can also be applied to two-player turn-based games with incom-
plete information (Kocsis and Szepesva´ri, 2006; Cowling et al., 2012; Teraoka et al., 2014;
Whitehouse, 2014; Kaufmann and Koolen, 2017), which lays the foundation for the recent
success of deep RL for the game of Go (Silver et al., 2016). Moreover, these methods are
shown to converge to the minimax solution of the game, thus can be viewed as a counter-
part of minimax-Q learning with Monte-Carlo sampling.
4.2.2 Policy-Based Methods
Policy-based reinforcement learning methods introduced in §2.1.2 can also be extended to
the multi-agent setting. Instead of finding the fixed point of the Bellman operator, a fair
amount of methods only focus on a single agent and aim to maximize the expected return
of that agent, disregarding the other agents’ policies. Specifically, from the perspective
of a single agent, the environment is time-varying as the other agents also adapt their
policies. Policy based methods aim to achieve the optimal performance when other agents
play arbitrarily by minimizing the (external) regret, that is, find a sequence of actions
that perform nearly as well as the optimal fixed policy in hindsight. An algorithm with
negligible average overall regret is called no-regret or Hannan consistent (Hannan, 1957).
Any Hannan consistent algorithm is known to have the following two desired properties.
First, when other agents adopt stationary policies, the time-average policy constructed by
the algorithm converges to the best response policy (against the ones used by the other
agents). Second, more interestingly, in two-player zero-sum games, when both players
adopt Hannan consistent algorithms and both their average overall regrets are no more
than , their time-average policies constitute a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium (Blum
and Mansour, 2007). Thus, any Hannan consistent single-agent reinforcement learning
algorithm can be applied to find the Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games via
self-play. Most of these methods belong to one of the following two families: fictitious
play (Brown, 1951; Robinson, 1951), and counterfactual regret minimization (Zinkevich
et al., 2008), which will be summarized below.
Fictitious play is a classic algorithm studied in game theory, where the players play
the game repeatedly and each player adopts a policy that best responds to the average
policy of the other agents. This method was originally proposed for solving normal-form
games, which are a simplification of the Markov games defined in Definition 2.2 with S
being a singleton and γ = 0. In particular, for any joint policy pi ∈ ∆(A) of the N agents,
we let pi−i be the marginal policy of all players except for player i. For any t ≥ 1, suppose
the agents have played {aτ : .1 ≤ τ ≤ t} in the first t stages. We define xt as the empirical
distribution of {aτ : .1 ≤ τ ≤ t}, i.e., xt(a) = t−1∑tτ=11{at = a} for any a ∈ A. Then, in the t-th
stage, each agent i takes action ait ∈ Ai according to the best response policy against x−it .
In other words, each agent plays the best counter policy against the policy of the other
agents inferred from history data. Here, for any  > 0 and any pi ∈ ∆(A), we denote by
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Br(pi−i) the -best response policy of player i, which satisfies
Ri
(
Br(pi
−i),pi−1
)
≥ sup
µ∈∆(Ai )
Ri(µ,pi−i)− . (4.16)
Moreover, we define Br(pi) as the joint policy (Br(pi−1), . . . ,Br(pi−N )) ∈ ∆(A) and suppress
the subscript  in Br if  = 0. By this notation, regarding each a ∈ A as a vertex of ∆(A),
we can equivalently write the fictitious process as
xt − xt−1 = (1/t) · (at − xt−1), where at ∼ Br(xt−1). (4.17)
As t →∞, the updates in (4.17) can be approximately characterized by a differential in-
clusion (Benaı¨m et al., 2005)
dx(t)
dt
∈ Br(x(t))− x(t), (4.18)
which is known as the continuous-time fictitious play. Although it is well known that the
discrete-time fictitious play in (4.17) is not Hannan consistent (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001;
Young, 1993), it is shown in Monderer et al. (1997); Viossat and Zapechelnyuk (2013) that
the continuous-time fictitious play in (4.18) is Hannan consistent. Moreover, using tools
from stochastic approximation (Kushner and Yin, 2003; Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001), var-
ious modifications of discrete-time fictitious play based on techniques such as smoothing
or stochastic perturbations have been shown to converge to the continuous-time fictitious
play and are thus Hannan consistent (Fudenberg and Levine, 1995; Hofbauer and Sand-
holm, 2002; Leslie and Collins, 2006; Benaı¨m and Faure, 2013; Li and Tewari, 2018). As
a result, applying these methods with self-play provably finds a Nash equilibrium of a
two-player zero-sum normal form game.
Furthermore, fictitious play methods have also been extended to RL settings without
the model knowledge. Specifically, using sequence-form representation, Heinrich et al.
(2015) has proposed the first fictitious play algorithm for extensive-form games which is
realization-equivalent to the generalized weakened fictitious play (Leslie and Collins, 2006)
for normal-form games. The pivotal insight is that a convex combination of normal-form
policies can be written as a weighted convex combination of behavioral policies using
realization probabilities. Specifically, recall that the set of information states of agent i
was denoted by S i . When the game has perfect-recall, each si ∈ S i uniquely defines a
sequence σsi of actions played by agent i for reaching state s
i . Then any behavioral policy
pii of agent i induces a realization probability Rp(pii ; ·) for each sequence σ of agent i, which
is defined by Rp(pii ;σ ) =
∏
(σs′ ,a)vσ pi
i(a |s′), where the product is taken over all s′ ∈ S i and
a ∈ Ai such that (σs′ , a) is a subsequence of σ . Using the notation of realization probability,
for any two behavioral policies pi and pi of agent i, the sum
λ · Rp(pi,σsi ) ·pi(· |si)
λ · Rp(pi,σsi ) + (1−λ) · Rp(pi,σsi ) +
(1−λ) · Rp(pi,σsi ) ·pi(· |si)
λ · Rp(pi,σsi ) + (1−λ) · Rp(pi,σsi ) , ∀s
i ∈ S i , (4.19)
is the mixture policy of pi and pi with weights λ ∈ (0,1) and 1 − λ, respectively. Then,
combining (4.16) and (4.19), the fictitious play algorithm in Heinrich et al. (2015) com-
putes a sequence of policies {pit}t≥1. In particular, in the t-th iteration, any agent i first
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compute the t+1-best response policy pi
i
t+1 ∈ Br(pi−it ) and then constructs piit+1 as the mix-
ture policy of piit and pit+1 with weights 1 −αt+1 and αt+1, respectively. Here, both t and
αt are taken to converge to zero as t goes to infinity, and we further have
∑
t≥1αt = ∞.
We note, however, that although such a method provably converges to a Nash equilib-
rium of a zero-sum game via self-play, it suffers from the curse of dimensionality due to
the need to iterate all states of the game in each iteration. For computational efficiency,
Heinrich et al. (2015) has also proposed a data-drive fictitious self-play framework where
the best-response is computed via fitted Q-iteration (Ernst et al., 2005; Munos, 2007) for
the single-agent RL problem, with the policy mixture being learned through supervised
learning. This framework was later adopted by Heinrich and Silver (2014, 2016); Kawa-
mura et al. (2017); Zhang et al. (2019) to incorporate other single RL methods such as
deep Q-network (Mnih et al., 2015) and Monte-Carlo tree search (Coulom, 2006; Kocsis
and Szepesva´ri, 2006; Browne et al., 2012). Moreover, in a more recent work, Perolat et al.
(2018) has proposed a smooth fictitious play algorithm (Fudenberg and Levine, 1995)
for zero-sum stochastic games with simultaneous moves. Their algorithm combines the
actor-critic framework (Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000) with fictitious self-play, and infers
the opponent’s policy implicitly via policy evaluation. Specifically, when the two players
adopt a joint policy pi = (pi1,pi2), from the perspective of player 1, it infers pi2 implicitly
by estimating Qpi1,pi2 via temporal-difference learning (Sutton and Barto, 1987), where
Qpi1,pi2 : S ×A1→R is defined as
Qpi1,pi2(s,a
1) = E
[∑
t≥0
γ tR1(st, at, st+1)
∣∣∣∣∣s0 = s,a10 = a1, a20 ∼ pi2(· |s), at ∼ pi(· |st),∀t ≥ 1],
which is the action-value function of player 1 marginalized by pi2. Besides, the best re-
sponse policy is obtained by taking the soft-greedy policy with respect to Qpi1,pi2 , i.e.,
pi1(a1 |s)← exp[η
−1 ·Qpi1,pi2(s,a1)]∑
a1∈A1 exp[η−1 ·Qpi1,pi2(s,a1)]
, (4.20)
where η > 0 is the smoothing parameter. Finally, the algorithm is obtained by performing
both policy evaluation and policy update in (4.20) simultaneously using two-timescale
updates (Borkar, 2008; Kushner and Yin, 2003), which ensure that the policy updates,
when using self-play, can be characterized by an ordinary differential equation whose
asymptotically stable solution is a smooth Nash equilibrium of the game.
Another family of popular policy-based methods is based on the idea of counterfac-
tural regret minimization (CFR), first proposed in Zinkevich et al. (2008), which has been
a breakthrough in the effort to solve large-scale extensive-form games. Moreover, from
a theoretical perspective, compared with fictitious play algorithms whose convergence
is analyzed asymptotically via stochastic approximation, explicit regret bounds are estab-
lished using tools from online learning (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006), which yield rates
of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Specifically, when N agents play the extensive-
form game for T rounds with {pit : 1 ≤ t ≤ T }, the regret of player i is defined as
RegiT = max
pii
T∑
t=1
[
Ri(pii ,pi−it )−Ri(piit ,pi−it )
]
, (4.21)
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where the maximum is taken over all possible policies of player i. In the following, before
we define the notion of counterfactual regret, we first introduce a few notations. Recall
that we had defined the reach probability ηpi(h) in (2.4), which can be factorized into
the product of each agent’s contribution. That is, for each i ∈ U ∪ {c}, we can group the
probability terms involving pii into ηipi(h) and write ηpi(h) =
∏
i∈N∪{c}ηipi(h) = ηipi(h) · η−ipi (h).
Moreover, for any two histories h,h′ ∈ H satisfying h v h′, we define the conditional reach
probability ηpi(h′ |h) as ηpi(h′)/ηpi(h) and define ηipi(h′ |h) similarly. For any s ∈ S i and any
a ∈ A(s), we define Z(s,a) = {(h,z) ∈ H×Z |h ∈ s,ha v z}, which contains all possible pairs
of history in information state s and terminal history after taking action a at s. Then, the
counterfactual value function is defined as
QiCF(pi,s,a) =
∑
(h,z)∈Z(s,a)
η−ipi (h) · ηpi(z |ha) ·Ri(z), (4.22)
which is the expected utility obtained by agent i given that it has played to reached
state s. We also define V iCF(pi,s) =
∑
a∈A(s)QiCF(pi,s,a) ·pii(a |s). Then the difference between
QiCF(pi,s,a) and V
i
CF(pi,s) can be viewed as the value of action a at information state s ∈ S i ,
and counterfactual regret of agent i at state s is defined as
RegiT (s) = max
a∈A(s)
T∑
i=1
[
QiCF(pit, s,a)−V iCF(pit, s)
]
, ∀s ∈ S i . (4.23)
Moreover, as shown in Theorem 3 of Zinkevich et al. (2008), counterfactual regrets de-
fined in (4.23) provide an upper bound for the total regret in (4.21):
RegiT ≤
∑
s∈S i
Regi,+T (s), (4.24)
where we let x+ denote max{x,0} for any x ∈R. This bound lays the foundation of counter-
factual regret minimization algorithms. Specifically, to minimize the total regret in (4.21),
it suffices to minimize the counterfactual regret for each information state, which can be
obtained by any online learning algorithm, such as EXP3 (Auer et al., 2002), Hedge (Vovk,
1990; Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994; Freund and Schapire, 1999), and regret matching
(Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000). All these methods ensures that the counterfactual regret
is O(√T ) for all s ∈ S i , which leads to an O(√T ) upper bound of the total regret. Thus,
applying CFR-type methods with self-play to a zero-sum two-play extensive-form game,
the average policy is an O(√1/T )-approximate Nash equilibrium after T steps. In particu-
lar, the vanilla CFR algorithm updates the policies via regret matching, which yields that
RegiT (s) ≤ Rimax ·
√
Ai · T for all s ∈ S i , where we have introduced
Rimax = max
z∈Z R
i(z)−min
z∈Z R
i(z), Ai = max
h : τ(h)=i
|A(h)|.
Thus, by (4.24), the total regret of agent i is bounded by Rimax · |S i | ·
√
Ai · T .
One drawback of vanilla CFR is that the entire game tree needs to be traversed in
each iteration, which can be computationally prohibitive. A number of CFR variants have
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been proposed since the pioneering work Zinkevich et al. (2008) for improving compu-
tational efficiency. For example, Lanctot et al. (2009); Burch et al. (2012); Gibson et al.
(2012); Johanson et al. (2012); Lisy` et al. (2015); Schmid et al. (2019) combine CFR with
Monte-Carlo sampling; Waugh et al. (2015); Morrill (2016); Brown et al. (2019) propose to
estimate the counterfactual value functions via regression; Brown and Sandholm (2015);
Brown et al. (2017); Brown and Sandholm (2017) improve efficiency by pruning subopti-
mal paths in the game tree; Tammelin (2014); Tammelin et al. (2015); Burch et al. (2019)
analyze the performance of a modification named CFR+, and Zhou et al. (2018) proposes
lazy updates with a near-optimal regret upper bound.
Furthermore, it has been shown recently in Srinivasan et al. (2018) that CFR is closely
related to policy gradient methods. To see this, for any joint policy pi and any i ∈ N , we
define the action-value function of agent i, denoted by Qipi, as
Qipi(s,a) =
1
ηpi(s)
·
∑
(h,z)∈Z(s,a)
ηpi(h) · ηpi(z |ha) ·Ri(z), ∀s ∈ S i ,∀a ∈ A(s). (4.25)
That is, Qipi(s,a) the expected utility of agent i when the agents follow policy pi and agent
i takes action a at information state s ∈ S i , conditioning on s being reached. It has been
shown in Srinivasan et al. (2018) that the QiCF in (4.22) is connected with Q
i
pi in (4.25) via
QiCF(pi,s,a) = Q
i
pi(s,a) · [
∑
h∈s η−ipi (h)]. Moreover, in the tabular setting where we regard the
joint policy pi as a table {pii(a |s) : s ∈ S i , a ∈ A(s)}, for any s ∈ S i and any a ∈ A(s), the policy
gradient Ri(pi) can be written as
∂Ri(pi)
∂pii(a |s)
= ηpi(s) ·Qipi(s,a) = ηipi(s) ·QiCF(pi,s,a), ∀s ∈ S i ,∀a ∈ A(s).
As a result, the advantage actor-critic (A2C) algorithm (Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2000) is
equivalent to a particular CFR algorithm, where the policy update rule is specified by
the generalized infinitesimal gradient ascent algorithm (Zinkevich, 2003). Thus, Srinivasan
et al. (2018) proves that the regret of the tabular A2C algorithm is bounded by |S i | · [1 +
Ai · (Rimax)2] ·
√
T . Following this work, Omidshafiei et al. (2019) shows that A2C where
the policy is tabular and is parametrized by a softmax function is equivalent to CFR that
uses Hedge to update the policy. Moreover, Lockhart et al. (2019) proposes a policy opti-
mization method known as exploitability descent, where the policy is updated using actor-
critic, assuming the opponent plays the best counter-policy. This method is equivalent to
the CFR-BR algorithm (Johanson et al., 2012) with Hedge. Thus, Srinivasan et al. (2018);
Omidshafiei et al. (2019); Lockhart et al. (2019) show that actor-critic and policy gradient
methods for MARL can be formulated as CFR methods and thus convergence to a Nash
equilibrium of a zero-sum extensive-form game is guaranteed.
In addition, besides fictitious play and CFR methods introduced above, multiple pol-
icy optimization methods have been proposed for special classes of two-player zero-sum
stochastic games or extensive form games. For example, Monte-Carlo tree search methods
have been proposed for perfect-information extensive games with simultaneous moves. It
has been shown in Schaeffer et al. (2009) that the MCTS methods with UCB-type action se-
lection rules, introduced in §4.2.1, fail to converge to a Nash equilibrium in simultaneous-
move games, as UCB does not take into consideration the possibly adversarial moves of
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the opponent. To remedy this issue, Lanctot et al. (2013); Lisy` et al. (2013); Tak et al.
(2014); Kovarˇı´k and Lisy` (2018) have proposed to adopt stochastic policies and using Han-
nan consistent methods such as EXP3 (Auer et al., 2002) and regret matching (Hart and
Mas-Colell, 2000) to update the policies. With self-play, Lisy` et al. (2013) shows that the
average policy obtained by MCTS with any -Hannan consistent policy update method
converges to an O(D2 · )-Nash equilibrium, where D is the maximal depth.
Finally, there are surging interests in investigating policy gradient-based methods in
continuous games, i.e., the games with continuous state-action spaces. With policy param-
eterization, finding the NE of zero-sum Markov games becomes a nonconvex-nonconcave
saddle-point problem in general (Mazumdar and Ratliff, 2018; Mazumdar et al., 2019;
Zhang et al., 2019; Bu et al., 2019). This hardness is inherent, even in the simplest lin-
ear quadratic setting with linear function approximation (Zhang et al., 2019; Bu et al.,
2019). As a consequence, most of the convergence results are local (Mescheder et al.,
2017; Mazumdar and Ratliff, 2018; Adolphs et al., 2018; Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018;
Mertikopoulos et al., 2019; Fiez et al., 2019; Mazumdar et al., 2019; Jin et al., 2019), in
the sense that they address the convergence behavior around local NE points. Still, it
has been shown that the vanilla gradient-descent-ascent (GDA) update, which is equiv-
alent to the policy gradient update in MARL, fails to converge to local NEs, for either
the non-convergent behaviors such as limit cycling (Mescheder et al., 2017; Daskalakis
and Panageas, 2018; Balduzzi et al., 2018; Mertikopoulos et al., 2019), or the existence
of non-Nash stable limit points for the GDA dynamics (Adolphs et al., 2018; Mazumdar
et al., 2019). Consensus optimization (Mescheder et al., 2017), symplectic gradient ad-
justment (Balduzzi et al., 2018), and extragradient method (Mertikopoulos et al., 2019)
have been advocated to mitigate the oscillatory behaviors around the equilibria; while
Adolphs et al. (2018); Mazumdar et al. (2019) exploit the curvature information so that
all the stable limit points of the proposed updates are local NEs. Going beyond Nash
equilibria, Jin et al. (2019); Fiez et al. (2019) consider gradient-based learning for Stackel-
berg equilibria, which correspond to only the one-sided equilibrium solution in zero-sum
games, i.e., either minimax or maximin, as the order of which player acts first is vital in
nonconvex-nonconcave problems. Jin et al. (2019) introduces the concept of local minimax
point as the solution, and shows that GDA converges to local minimax points under mild
conditions. Fiez et al. (2019) proposes a two-timescale algorithm where the follower uses
a gradient-play update rule, instead of an exact best response strategy, which has been
shown to converge to the Stackelberg equilibria. Under a stronger assumption of gradient
dominance, Sanjabi et al. (2018); Nouiehed et al. (2019) have shown that nested gradient
descent methods converge to the stationary points of the outer-loop, i.e., minimax, prob-
lem at a sublinear rate.
We note that these convergence results have been developed for general continuous
games with agnostic cost/reward functions, meaning that the functions may have var-
ious forms, so long as they are differentiable, sometimes even (Lipschitz) smooth, w.r.t.
each agent’s policy parameter. For MARL, this is equivalent to requiring differentiabil-
ity/smoothness of the long-term return, which relies on the properties of the game, as well
as of the policy parameterization. Such an assumption is generally very restrictive. For
example, the Lipschitz smoothness assumption fails to hold for LQ games (Zhang et al.,
2019; Mazumdar et al., 2019; Bu et al., 2019), a special type of MGs. Fortunately, thanks
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to the special structure of the LQ setting, Zhang et al. (2019) has proposed several pro-
jected nested policy gradient methods that are guaranteed to have global convergence to
the NE, with convergence rates established. This appears to be the first-of-its-kind result
in MARL. Very recently, Bu et al. (2019) improves the results by removing the projection
step in the updates, for a more general class of such games.
4.3 Mixed Setting
In stark contrast with the fully collaborative and fully competitive settings, the mixed
setting is notoriously challenging and thus rather less well understood. Even in the sim-
plest case of a two-player general sum normal-form game, finding a Nash equilibrium is
PPAD-complete (Chen et al., 2009). Moreover, Zinkevich et al. (2006) has proved that
value-iteration methods fail to find stationary Nash or correlated equilibria for general-
sum Markov games. Recently, it is shown that vanilla policy-gradient methods avoid a
non-negligible subset of Nash equilibria in general-sum continuous games (Mazumdar
and Ratliff, 2018), including the LQ general-sum games (Mazumdar et al., 2019). Thus,
additional structures on either the games or the algorithms need to be exploited, to ascer-
tain provably convergent MARL in the mixed setting.
Value-Based Methods
Under relatively stringent assumptions, several value-based methods that extend Q-
learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992) to the mixed setting are guaranteed to find an equi-
librium. In particular, Hu and Wellman (2003) has proposed the Nash-Q learning al-
gorithm for general-sum Markov games, where one maintains N action-value functions
QN = (Q1, . . . ,QN ) : S ×A→ RN for all N agents, which are updated using sample-based
estimator of a Bellman operator. Specifically, letting RN = (R1, . . . ,RN ) denote the reward
functions of the agents, Nash-Q uses the following Bellman operator:
(T ∗QN )(s,a) = Es′∼P (· |s,a)
{
RN (s,a, s′) +γ · Nash
[
QN (s′, ·)
]}
, ∀(s,a) ∈ S ×A, (4.26)
where Nash[QN (s′, ·)] is the objective value of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game with
rewards {QN (s′, a)}a∈A. For zero-sum games, we have Q1 = −Q2 and thus the Bellman
operator defined in (4.26) is equivalent to the one in (4.14) used by minimax-Q learn-
ing (Littman, 1994). Moreover, Hu and Wellman (2003) establishes convergence to Nash
equilibrium under the restrictive assumption that Nash[QN (s′, ·)] in each iteration of the
algorithm has unique Nash equilibrium. In addition, Littman (2001) has proposed the
Friend-or-Foe Q-learning algorithm where each agent views the other agent as either a
“friend” or a “foe”. In this case, Nash[QN (s′, ·)] can be efficiently computed via linear pro-
gramming. This algorithm can be viewed as a generalization of minimax-Q learning, and
Nash equilibrium is guaranteed for two-player zero-sum games and coordination games
with unique equilibria. Furthermore, Greenwald et al. (2003) has proposed correlated Q-
learning, which replaces Nash[QN (s′, ·)] in (4.26) by computing a correlated equilibrium
(Aumann, 1974), a more general equilibrium concept than Nash equilibrium. In a recent
work, Perolat et al. (2017) has proposed a batch RL method to find an approximate Nash
equilibrium via Bellman residue minimization (Maillard et al., 2010). They have proved
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that the global minimizer of the empirical Bellman residue is an approximate Nash equi-
librium, followed by the error propagation analysis for the algorithm. Also in the batch RL
regime, Zhang et al. (2018b) has considered a simplified mixed setting for decentralized
MARL: two teams of cooperative networked agents compete in a zero-sum Markov game.
A decentralized variant of FQI, where the agents within one team cooperate to solve (4.3)
while the two teams essentially solve (4.15), is proposed. Finite-sample error bounds have
then been established for the proposed algorithm.
To address the scalability issue, independent learning is preferred, which, however,
fails to converge in general (Tan, 1993). Arslan and Yu¨ksel (2017) has proposed decentral-
ized Q-learning, a two timescale modification of Q-learning, that is guaranteed to converge
to the equilibrium for weakly acyclic Markov games almost surely. Each agent therein only
observes local action and reward, and neither observes nor keeps track of others’ actions.
All agents are instructed to use the same stationary baseline policy for many consecutive
stages, named exploration phase. At the end of the exploration phase, all agents are syn-
chronized to update their baseline policies, which makes the environment stationary for
long enough, and enables the convergence of Q-learning based methods. Note that these
algorithms can also be applied to the cooperative setting, as these games include Markov
teams as a special case.
Policy-Based Methods
For continuous games, due to the general negative results therein, Mazumdar and
Ratliff (2018) introduces a new class of games, Morse-Smale games, for which the gradi-
ent dynamics correspond to gradient-like flows. Then, definitive statements on almost
sure convergence of PG methods to either limit cycles, Nash equilibria, or non-Nash fixed
points can be made, using tools from dynamical systems theory. Moreover, Balduzzi et al.
(2018); Letcher et al. (2019) have studied the second-order structure of game dynamics, by
decomposing it into two components.The first one, named symmetric component, relates
to potential games, which yields gradient descent on some implicit function; the second
one, named antisymmetric component, relates to Hamiltonian games that follows some
conservation law, motivated by classical mechanical systems analysis. The fact that gra-
dient descent converges to the Nash equilibrium of both types of games motivates the de-
velopment of the Symplectic Gradient Adjustment (SGA) algorithm that finds stable fixed
points of the game, which constitute all local Nash equilibria for zero-sum games, and
only a subset of local NE for general-sum games. Chasnov et al. (2019) provides finite-
time local convergence guarantees to a neighborhood of a stable local Nash equilibrium
of continuous games, in both deterministic setting, with exact PG, and stochastic setting,
with unbiased PG estimates. Additionally, Chasnov et al. (2019) has also explored the ef-
fects of non-uniform learning rates on the learning dynamics and convergence rates. Fiez
et al. (2019) has also considered general-sum Stackelberg games, and shown that the same
two-timescale algorithm update as in the zero-sum case now converges almost surely to
the stable attractors only. It has also established finite-time performance for local conver-
gence to a neighborhood of a stable Stackelberg equilibrium. In complete analogy to the
zero-sum class, these convergence results for continuous games do not apply to MARL
in Markov games directly, as they are built upon the differentiability/smoothness of the
long-term return, which may not hold for general MGs, for example, LQ games (Mazum-
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dar et al., 2019).
Other than continuous games, the policy-based methods summarized in §4.2.2 can also
be applied to the mixed setting via self-play. The validity of such an approach is based a
fundamental connection between game theory and online learning – If the external regret
of each agent is no more than , then their average policies constitute an -approximate
coarse correlated equilibrium (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000, 2001, 2003). Thus, although in
general we are unable to find a Nash equilibrium, policy optimization with self-play guar-
antees to find a coarse correlated equilibrium.
Mean-Field Regime
The scalability issue in the non-cooperative setting can also be alleviated in the mean-
field regime, as the cooperative setting discussed in §4.1.1. For general-sum games, Yang
et al. (2018) has proposed a modification of the Nash-Q learning algorithm where the
actions of other agents are approximated by their empirical average. That is, the action
value function of each agent i is parametrized by Qi(s,ai ,µa−i ), where µa−i is the empirical
distribution of {aj : j , i}. Asymptotic convergence of this mean-field Nash-Q learning
algorithm has also been established.
Besides, most mean-field RL algorithms are focused on addressing the mean-field game
model. In mean-field games, each agent i has a local state si ∈ S and a local action ai ∈ S ,
and the interaction among other agents is captured by an aggregated effect µ, also known
as the mean-field, which is a functional of the empirical distribution of the local states
and actions of the agents. Specifically, at the t-th time step, when agent i takes action ait
at state sit and the mean-field term is µt, it receives an immediate reward R(s
i
t , a
i
t,µt) and
its local state evolves into sit+1 ∼ P (· |sit , ait,µt) ∈ ∆(S). Thus, from the perspective of agent
i, instead of participating in a multi-agent game, it is faced with a time-varying MDP pa-
rameterized by the sequence of mean-field terms {µt}t≥∞, which in turn is determined by
the states and actions of all agents. The solution concept in MFGs is the Mean-field equi-
librium, which is a sequence of pairs of policy and mean-field terms {pi∗t ,µ∗t}t≥0 that satisfy
the following two conditions: (1) pi∗ = {pi∗t}t≥0 is the optimal policy for the time-varying
MDP specified by µ∗ = {µ∗t}t≥0, and (2) µ∗ is generated when each agent follows policy
pi∗. The existence of the mean-field equilibrium for discrete-time MFGs has been studied
in Saldi et al. (2018, 2019); Saldi (2019); Saldi et al. (2018) and their constructive proofs
exhibit that the mean-field equilibrium can be obtained via a fixed-point iteration. Specif-
ically, one can construct a sequence of policies and mean-field terms {pi(i)}i≥1 and {µ(i)}i≥1
such that {pi(i)}t≥0 solves the time-varying MDP specified by µ(i), and µ(i+1) is generated
when all players adopt policy pi(i). Following this agenda, various model-free RL methods
are proposed for solving MFGs where {pi(i)}i≥1 is approximately solved via single-agent
RL such as Q-learning (Guo et al., 2019) and policy-based methods (Subramanian and
Mahajan, 2019; Fu et al., 2019), with {µ(i)}i≥1 being estimated via sampling. In addition,
Hadikhanloo and Silva (2019); Elie et al. (2019) recently propose fictitious play updates
for the mean-field state where we have µ(i+1) = (1−α(i)) ·µ(i) +α(i) · µˆ(i+1), with α(i) being the
learning rate and µˆ(i+1) being the mean-field term generated by policy pi(i). Note that the
aforementioned works focus on the settings with either finite horizon (Hadikhanloo and
Silva, 2019; Elie et al., 2019) or stationary mean-field equilibria (Guo et al., 2019; Subra-
manian and Mahajan, 2019; Fu et al., 2019) only. Instead, recent works Anahtarci et al.
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Figure 3: Four representative applications of recent successes of MARL: unmanned aerial
vehicles, game of Go, Poker games, and team-battle video games.
(2019); Zaman et al. (2020) consider possibly non-stationary mean-field equilibrium in
infinite-horizon settings, and develop equilibrium computation algorithms that lay foun-
dations for model-free RL algorithms.
5 Application Highlights
In this section, we briefly review the recent empirical successes of MARL driven by the
methods introduced in the previous section. In the following, we focus on the three MARL
settings reviewed in §4 and highlight four most representative and practical applications
in each setting, as illustrated in Figure 3.
5.1 Cooperative Setting
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
One prominent application of MARL is the control of practical multi-agent systems,
most of which are cooperative and decentralized. Examples of the scenarios include robot
team navigation (Corke et al., 2005), smart grid operation (Dall’Anese et al., 2013), and
control of mobile sensor networks (Cortes et al., 2004). Here we choose unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) (Yang and Liu, 2018; Pham et al., 2018; Tozˇicˇka et al., 2018; Shamsoshoara
et al., 2019; Cui et al., 2019; Qie et al., 2019), a recently surging application scenario of
multi-agent autonomous systems, as one representative example. Specifically, a team of
UAVs are deployed to accomplish a cooperation task, usually without the coordination of
any central controller, i.e., in a decentralized fashion. Each UAV is normally equipped
with communication devices, so that they can exchange information with some of their
teammates, provided that they are inside its sensing and coverage range. As a con-
sequence, this application naturally fits in the decentralized paradigm with networked
agents we advocated in §4.1.2, which is also illustrated in Figure 2 (b). Due to the high-
mobility of UAVs, the communication links among agents are indeed time-varying and
fragile, making (online) cooperation extremely challenging. Various challenges thus arise
in the context of cooperative UAVs, some of which have recently been addressed by MARL.
In Yang and Liu (2018), the UAVs’ optimal links discovery and selection problem is
considered. Each UAV u ∈ U , where U is the set of all UAVs, has the capability to perceive
the local available channels and select a connected link over a common channel shared by
another agent v ∈ U . Each UAV u has its local set of channels Cu with Cu⋂Cv , ∅ for any
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u,v, and a connected link between two adjacent UAVs is built if they announce their mes-
sages on the same channel simultaneously. Each UAV’s local state is whether the previous
message has been successfully sent, and its action is to choose a pair (v,chu), with v ∈ Tu
and chu ∈ Cu , where Tu is the set of teammates that agent u can reach. The availability of
local channels chu ∈ Cu is modeled as probabilistic, and the rewardRu is calculated by the
number of messages that are successfully sent. Essentially, the algorithm in Yang and Liu
(2018) is based on independent Q-learning (Tan, 1993), but with two heuristics to improve
the tractability and convergence performance: by fractional slicing, it treats each dimen-
sion (fraction) of the action space independently, and estimate the actual Q-value by the
average of that for all fractions; by mutual sampling, it shares both state-action pairs and a
mutual Q-function parameter. Pham et al. (2018) addresses the problem of field coverage,
where the UAVs aim to provide a full coverage of an unknown field, while minimizing the
overlapping sections among their field of views. Modeled as a Markov team, the overall
state s is the concatenation of all local states si , which are defined as its 3-D position co-
ordinates in the environment. Each agent chooses to either head different directions, or
go up and down, yielding 6 possible actions. Modeled as a Markov team, a multi-agent
Q-learning over the joint action space is developed, with linear function approximation.
In contrast, Shamsoshoara et al. (2019) focuses on spectrum sharing among a network of
UAVs. Under a remote sensing task, the UAVs are categorized into two clusters: the re-
laying ones that provide relay services and gain spectrum access for the remaining ones,
which perform the sensing task. Such a problem can be modeled as a deterministic MMDP,
which can thus be solved by distributed Q-learning proposed in Lauer and Riedmiller
(2000), with optimality guaranteed. Moreover, Qie et al. (2019) considers the problem
of simultaneous target-assignment and path-planning for multiple UAVs. In particular, a
team of UAVs Ui ∈U, with each Ui ’s position at time t given by (xUi (t), yUi (t)), aim to cover
all the targets Tj ∈ T without collision with the threat areas Di ∈ D, as well as with other
UAVs. For each Ui , a path Pi is planned as Pi = {(xUi (0), yUi (0), · · · ,xUi (n), yUi (n))}, and the
length of Pi is denoted by di . Thus, the goal is to minimize
∑
i di while the collision-free
constraints are satisfied. By penalizing the collision in the reward function, such a prob-
lem can be characterized as one with a mixed MARL setting that contains both cooperative
and competitive agents. Hence, the MADDPG algorithm proposed in Lowe et al. (2017) is
adopted, with centralized-learning-decentralized-execution. Two other tasks that can be
tackled by MARL include resource allocation in UAV-enabled communication networks,
using Q-learning based method (Cui et al., 2019), aerial surveillance and base defense
in UAV fleet control, using policy optimization method in a purely centralized fashion
(Tozˇicˇka et al., 2018).
Learning to Communicate
Another application of cooperative MARL aims to foster communication and coordi-
nation among a team of agents without explicit human supervision. Such a type of prob-
lems is usually formulated as a multi-agent POMDP involving N agents, which is similar
to the Markov game introduced in Definition 2.2 except that each agent cannot observe
the state s ∈ S and that each agent has the same reward function R. More specifically, we
assume that each agent i ∈ N receives observations from set Y i via a noisy observation
channel Oi : S → P (Yi) such that agent i observes a random variable yi ∼ Oi(· |s) when the
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environment is at state s. Note that this model can be viewed as a POMDP when there
is a central planner that collects the observations of each agent and decides the actions
for each agent. Due to the noisy observation channels, in such a model the agents need to
communicate with each other so as to better infer the underlying state and make decisions
that maximize the expected return shared by all agents. Let N it ⊆ N be the neighbors of
agent i at the t-th time step, that is, agent i is able to receive a message mj→it from any
agent j ∈ N it at time t.We let I it denote the information agent i collects up to time t, which
is defined as
I it =
{(
oi`, {aj`}j∈N , {mj→i` }j∈N i`
)
: ` ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}
}⋃{
oit ,
}
, (5.1)
which contains its history collected in previous time steps and the observation received
at time t. With the information I it , agent i takes an action a
i
t ∈ Ai and also broadcasts
messagesmi→jt to all agents j such that i ∈ N jt . That is, the policy piit of agent i is a mapping
from I it to a (random) action a˜it = (ait, {mi→jt : i ∈ N jt }), i.e., a˜it ∼ piit(· | I it ). Notice that the size
of information set I it grows as t grows. To handle the memory issue, it is common to first
embed I it in a fixed latent space via recurrent neural network (RNN) or Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) and define the value and policy
functions on top of the embedded features. Moreover, most existing works in this line
of research adopt the paradigm of centralized learning and utilize techniques such as
weight-sharing or attention mechanism (Vaswani et al., 2017) to increase computational
efficiency. With centralized learning, single-agent RL algorithms such as Q-learning and
actor-critic are readily applicable.
In particular, Foerster et al. (2016) first proposes to tackle the problem of learning
to communicate via deep Q-learning. They propose to use two Q networks that govern
taking action ai ∈ A and producing messages separately. Their training algorithm is an
extension of the deep recurrent Q-learning (DRQN) (Hausknecht and Stone, 2015), which
combines RNN and deep Q-learning (Mnih et al., 2015). Following Foerster et al. (2016),
various works (Jorge et al., 2016; Sukhbaatar et al., 2016; Havrylov and Titov, 2017; Das
et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2017; Mordatch and Abbeel, 2018; Jiang and Lu, 2018; Jiang et al.,
2018; Celikyilmaz et al., 2018; Das et al., 2018; Lazaridou et al., 2018; Cogswell et al.,
2019) have proposed a variety of neural network architectures to foster communication
among agents. These works combine single-agent RL methods with novel developments
in deep learning, and demonstrate their performances via empirical studies. Among these
works, Das et al. (2017); Havrylov and Titov (2017); Mordatch and Abbeel (2018); Lazari-
dou et al. (2018); Cogswell et al. (2019) have reported the emergence of computational
communication protocols among the agents when the RL algorithm is trained from scratch
with text or image inputs. We remark that the algorithms used in these works are more
akin to single-agent RL due to centralized learning. For more details overviews of multi-
agent communication, we refer the interested readers to Section 6 of Oroojlooy Jadid and
Hajinezhad (2019) and Section 3 of Hernandez-Leal et al. (2018).
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5.2 Competitive Setting
In terms of the competitive setting, in the following, we highlight the recent applications
of MARL to the game of Go and Texas hold’em poker, which are archetypal instances of two-
player perfect-information and partial-information extensive-form games, respectively.
The Game of Go
The game of Go is a board game played by two competing players, with the goal of
surrounding more territory on the board than the opponent. These two players have ac-
cess to white or black stones respectively, and take turns placing their stones on a 19× 19
board, representing their territories. In each move, a player can place a stone to any of
the total 361 positions on the board that is not already taken by a stone. Once placed on
the board, the stones cannot be moved. But the stones will be removed from the board
when completely surrounded by opposing stones. The game terminates when neither of
the players is unwilling or unable to make a further move, and the winner is determined
by counting the area of the territory and the number of stones captured by the players.
The game of Go can be viewed as a two-player zero-sum Markov game with deter-
ministic state transitions, and the reward only appears at the end of the game. The state
of this Markov game is the current configuration of the board and the reward is either
one or minus one, representing either a win or a loss, respectively. Specifically, we have
r1(s) + r2(s) = 0 for any state s ∈ S , and r1(s), r2(s) ∈ {1,−1} when s is a terminating state,
and r1(s) = r2(s) = 0 otherwise. Let V i∗ (s) denote the optimal value function of player
i ∈ {1,2}. Thus, in this case, [1 + V i(s)]/2 is the probability of player i ∈ {1,2} winning
the game when the current state is s and both players follow the Nash equilibrium poli-
cies thereafter. Moreover, as this Markov game is turn-based, it is known that the Nash
equilibrium policies of the two players are deterministic (Hansen et al., 2013). Further-
more, since each configuration of the board can be constructed from a sequence of moves
of the two players due to deterministic transitions, we can also view the game of Go as
an extensive-form game with perfect information. This problem is notoriously challeng-
ing due to the gigantic state space. It is estimated in Allis (1994) that the size of state
space exceeds 10360, which forbids the usage of any traditional reinforcement learning or
searching algorithms.
A significant breakthrough has been made by the AlphaGo introduced in Silver et al.
(2016), which is the first computer Go program that defeats a human professional player
on a full-sized board. AlphaGo integrates a variety of ideas from deep learning and re-
inforcement learning and tackles the challenge of huge state space by representing the
policy and value functions using deep convolutional neural networks (CNN) (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012). Specifically, both the policy and value networks are 13-layer CNNs with the
same architecture, and a board configuration is represented by 48 features. Thus, both
the policy and value networks take inputs of size 19 × 19 × 48. These two networks are
trained through a novel combination of supervised learning from human expert data and
reinforcement learning from Monte-Carlo tree search (MCTS) and self-play. Specifically,
in the first stage, the policy network is trained by supervised learning to predict the ac-
tions made by the human players, where the dataset consists of 30 million positions from
the KGS Go server. That is, for any state-action pair (s,a) in the dataset, the action a is
treated as the response variable and the state s is regarded as the covariate. The weights
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of the policy network is trained via stochastic gradient ascent to maximize the likelihood
function. After initializing the policy network via supervised learning, in the second stage
of the pipeline, both the policy and value networks are trained via reinforcement learning
and self-play. In particular, new data are generated by games played between the current
policy network and a random previous iteration of the policy network. Moreover, the
policy network is updated following policy gradient, and the value network aims to find
the value function associated with the policy network and is updated by minimizing the
mean-squared prediction error. Finally, when playing the game, the current iterates of
the policy and value networks are combined to produce an improved policy by lookahead
search via MCTS. The actual action taken by AlphaGo is determined by such an MCTS
policy. Moreover, to improve computational efficiency, AlphaGo uses an asynchronous
and distributed version of MCTS to speed up simulation.
Since the advent of AlphaGo, an improved version, known as AlphaGo Zero, has been
proposed in Silver et al. (2017). Compared with the vanilla AlphaGo, AlphaGo Zero
does not use supervised learning to initialize the policy network. Instead, both the pol-
icy and value networks are trained from scratch solely via reinforcement learning and
self-play. Besides, instead of having separate policy and value functions share the same
network architecture, in AlphaGo Zero, these two networks are aggregated into a single
neural network structure. Specifically, the policy and value functions are represented by
(p(s),V (s)) = fθ(s), where s ∈ S is the state which represents the current board, fθ is a deep
CNN with parameter θ, V (s) is a scalar that corresponds to the value function, and p(s) is
a vector which represents the policy, i.e., for each entry a ∈ A, pa(s) is the probability of
taking action a at state s. Thus, under such a network structure, the policy and value net-
works automatically share the same low-level representations of the states. Moreover, the
parameter θ of network fθ is trained via self-play and MCTS. Specifically, at each time-
step t, based on the policy p and value V given by fθt , an MCTS policy pit can be obtained
and a move is executed following policy pit(st). Such a simulation procedure continues
until the current game terminates. Then the outcome of the t-th time-step, zt ∈ {1,−1}, is
recorded, according to the perspective of the player at time-step t. Then the parameter θ
is updated by a stochastic gradient step on a loss function `t, which is defined as
`t(θ) = [z −V (st)]2 −pi>t logp(st) + c · ‖θ‖22, (p(·),V (·)) = fθ(·).
Thus, `t is the sum of the mean-squared prediction error of the value function, cross-
entropy loss between the policy network and the MCTS policy, and a weight-decay term
for regularization. It is reported that AlphaGo Zero has defeated the strongest versions of
the previous AlphaGo and that it also has demonstrated non-standard Go strategies that
had not been discovered before. Finally, the techniques adopted in AlphaGo Zero has been
generalized to other challenging board games. Specifically, Silver et al. (2018) proposes
the AlphaZero program that is trained by self-play and reinforcement learning with zero
human knowledge and achieves superhuman performances in the games of chess, shogi,
and Go.
Texas Hold’em Poker
Another remarkable applicational achievement of MARL in the competitive setting
focuses on developing artificial intelligence in the Texas hold’em poker, which is one of
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the most popular variations of the poker. Texas hold’em is usually played by a group of
two or more players, where each player is first dealt with two private cards face down.
Then five community cards are dealt face up in three rounds. In each round. each player
has four possible actions – check, call, raise, and fold. After all the cards are dealt, each
player who has not folded have seven cards in total, consisting of five community cards
and two private cards. Each of these players then finds the best five-card poker hand out
of all combinations of the seven cards. The player with the best hand is the winner and
wins all the money that the players wager for that hand, which as also known as the pot.
Note that each hand of Texas hold’em terminates after three rounds, and the payoffs of the
player are only known after the hand ends. Also notice that each player is unaware of the
private cards of the rest of the players. Thus, Texas hold’em is an instance of multi-player
extensive-form game with incomplete information. The game is called heads-up when
there are only two players. When both the bet sizes and the amount of allowed raises are
fixed, the game is called limit hold’em. In the no-limit hold’em, however, each player may
bet or raise any amount up to all of the money the player has at the table, as long as it
exceeds the previous bet or raise.
There has been quest for developing superhuman computer poker programs for over
two decades (Billings et al., 2002; Rubin and Watson, 2011). Various methods have been
shown successful for simple variations of poker such as Kuhn poker (Kuhn, 1950) and
Leduc hold’em (Southey et al., 2005). However, the full-fledged Texas hold’em is much
more challenging and several breakthroughs have been achieved only recently. The sim-
plest version of Texas hold’em is heads-up limit hold’em (HULHE), which has 3.9 × 1014
information sets in total (Bowling et al., 2015), where a player is required to take an ac-
tion at each information set. Bowling et al. (2015) has for the first time reported solving
HULHE to approximate Nash equilibrium via CFR+ (Tammelin, 2014; Tammelin et al.,
2015), a variant of counterfactual regret minimization (Zinkevich et al., 2008). Subse-
quently, other methods such as Neural Fictitious Self-Play (Heinrich and Silver, 2016) and
Monte-Carlo tree search with self-play (Heinrich and Silver, 2015) have also been adopted
to successfully solve HULHE.
Despite these breakthroughs, heads-up no-limit hold’em (HUNL) has remained open
until recently, which has more than 6 × 10161 information sets, an astronomical number.
Thus, in HUNL, it is impossible (in today’s computational power) to traverse all informa-
tion sets, making it inviable to apply CFR+ as in Bowling et al. (2015). Ground-breaking
achievements have recently been made by DeepStack (Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017) and Libratus
(Brown and Sandholm, 2018), two computer poker programs developed independently,
which defeat human professional poker players in HUNL for the first time. Both of these
programs adopt CFR as the backbone of their algorithmic frameworks, but adopt different
strategies for handling the gigantic size of the game. In particular, DeepStack applies deep
learning to learn good representations of the game and propose deep counterfactual value
networks to integrate deep learning and CFR. Moreover, DeepStack adopts limited depth
lookahead planning to reduce the gigantic 6×10161 information sets to no more than 1017
information sets, thus making it possible to enumerate all information sets. In contrast,
Libratus does not utilize any deep learning techniques. Instead, it reduces the size of the
game by computation of an abstraction of the game, which is possible since many of the
information sets are very similar. Moreover, it further reduces the complexity using the
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sub-game decomposition technique (Burch et al., 2014; Moravcik et al., 2016; Brown and
Sandholm, 2017) for imperfect-information games and by constructing fine-grained ab-
stractions of the sub-games. When the abstractions are constructed, an improved version
of the Monte-Carlo CFR (Lanctot et al., 2009; Burch et al., 2012; Gibson et al., 2012) is
utilized to compute the policy. Furthermore, very recently, based upon Libratus, Brown
and Sandholm (2019) has proposed Pluribus, a computer poker program that has been
shown to be stronger than top human professionals in no-limit Texas hold’em poker with
six players. The success of Pluribus can be attributed to the following techniques that
have appeared in the literature: abstraction and sub-game decomposition for large-scale
imperfect-information games, Monte-Carlo CFR, self-play, and depth-limited search.
Other Applications
Furthermore, another popular testbed of MARL is the StarCraft II (Vinyals et al.,
2017), which is an immensely popular multi-player real-strategy computer game. This
game can be formulated as a multi-agent Markov game with partial observation, where
each player has only limited information of the game state. Designing reinforcement
learning systems for StarCraft II is extremely challenging due to the needs to make deci-
sions under uncertainty and incomplete information, to consider the optimal strategy in
the long-run, and to design good reward functions that elicits learning. Since released,
both the full-game and sub-game version of StarCraft II have gained tremendous research
interest. A breakthrough in this game was achieved by AlphaStar, recently proposed in
Vinyals et al. (2019), which has demonstrated superhuman performances in zero-sum
two-player full-game StarCraft II. Its reinforcement learning algorithm combines LSTM
for the parametrization of policy and value functions, asynchronous actor-critic (Mnih
et al., 2016) for policy updates, and neural fictitious self-play (Heinrich and Silver, 2016)
for equilibrium finding.
5.3 Mixed Settings
Compared to the cooperative and competitive settings, research on MARL under the
mixed setting is rather less explored. One application in this setting is multi-player poker.
As we have mentioned in §5.2, Pluribus introduced in Brown and Sandholm (2019) has
demonstrated superhuman performances in six-player no-limit Texas hold’em. In addi-
tion, as an extension of the problem of learning to communicate, introduced in §5.1, there
is a line of research that aims to apply MARL to tackle learning social dilemmas, which is
usually formulated as a multi-agent stochastic game with partial information. Thus, most
of the algorithms proposed under these settings incorporate RNN or LSTM for learning
representations of the histories experience by the agent, and the performances of these
algorithms are usually exhibited using experimental results; see, e.g., Leibo et al. (2017);
Lerer and Peysakhovich (2017); Hughes et al. (2018), and the references therein.
Moreover, another example of the mixed setting is the case where the agents are di-
vided into two opposing teams that play zero-sum games. The reward of a team is shared
by each player within this team. Compared with two-player zero-sum games, this setting
is more challenging in that both cooperation among teammates and competition against
the opposing team need to be taken into consideration. A prominent testbed of this case
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is the Dota 2 video game, where each of two teams, each with five players, aims to con-
quer the base of the other team and defend its own base. Each player independently
controls a powerful character known as the hero, and only observes the state of the game
via the video output on the screen. Thus, Dota 2 is a zero-sum Markov game played by
two teams, with each agent having imperfect information of the game. For this challeng-
ing problem, in 2018, OpenAI has proposed the OpenAI Five AI system (OpenAI, 2018),
which enjoys superhuman performances and has defeated human world champions in an
e-sports game. The algorithmic framework integrates LSTM for learning good represen-
tations and proximal policy optimization (Schulman et al., 2017) with self-play for policy
learning. Moreover, to balance between effective coordination and communication cost,
instead of having explicit communication channels among the teams, OpenAI Five uti-
lizes reward shaping by having a hyperparameter, named “team spirit”, to balance the
relative importance between each hero’s individual reward function and the average of
the team’s reward function.
6 Conclusions and Future Directions
Multi-agent RL has long been an active and significant research area in reinforcement
learning, in view of the ubiquity of sequential decision-making with multiple agents cou-
pled in their actions and information. In stark contrast to its great empirical success, the-
oretical understanding of MARL algorithms is well recognized to be challenging and rel-
atively lacking in the literature. Indeed, establishing an encompassing theory for MARL
requires tools spanning dynamic programming, game theory, optimization theory, and
statistics, which are non-trivial to unify and investigate within one context.
In this chapter, we have provided a selective overview of mostly recent MARL algo-
rithms, backed by theoretical analysis, followed by several high-profile but challenging
applications that have been addressed lately. Following the classical overview Busoniu
et al. (2008), we have categorized the algorithms into three groups: those solving prob-
lems that are fully cooperative, fully competitive, and a mix of the two. Orthogonal to
the existing reviews on MARL, this chapter has laid emphasis on several new angles and
taxonomies of MARL theory, some of which have been drawn from our own research
endeavors and interests. We note that our overview should not be viewed as a compre-
hensive one, but instead as a focused one dictated by our own interests and expertise,
which should appeal to researchers of similar interests, and provide a stimulus for fu-
ture research directions in this general topical area. Accordingly, we have identified the
following paramount while open avenues for future research on MARL theory.
Partially observed settings: Partial observability of the system states and the actions of
other agents is quintessential and inevitable in many practical MARL applications. In gen-
eral, these settings can be modeled as a partially observed stochastic game (POSG), which
includes the cooperative setting with a common reward function, i.e., the Dec-POMDP
model, as a special case. Nevertheless, as pointed out in §4.1.3, even the cooperative task is
NEXP-hard (Bernstein et al., 2002) and difficult to solve. In fact, the information state for
optimal decision-making in POSGs can be very complicated and involve belief generation
over the opponents’ policies (Hansen et al., 2004), compared to that in POMDPs, which
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requires belief on only states. This difficulty essentially stems from the heterogenous be-
liefs of agents resulting from their own observations obtained from the model, an inherent
challenge of MARL mentioned in §3 due to various information structures. It might be
possible to start by generalizing the centralized-learning-decentralized-execution scheme
for solving Dec-POMDPs (Amato and Oliehoek, 2015; Dibangoye and Buffet, 2018) to
solving POSGs.
Deep MARL theory: As mentioned in §3.3, using deep neural networks for function ap-
proximation can address the scalability issue in MARL. In fact, most of the recent em-
pirical successes in MARL result from the use of DNNs (Heinrich and Silver, 2016; Lowe
et al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2017; Gupta et al., 2017; Omidshafiei et al., 2017). Nonetheless,
because of lack of theoretical backings, we have not included details of these algorithms
in this chapter. Very recently, a few attempts have been made to understand the global
convergence of several single-agent deep RL algorithms, such as neural TD learning (Cai
et al., 2019) and neural policy optimization (Wang et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019), when
overparameterized neural networks (Arora et al., 2018; Li and Liang, 2018) are used. It
is thus promising to extend these results to multi-agent settings, as initial steps toward
theoretical understanding of deep MARL.
Model-based MARL: It may be slightly surprising that very few MARL algorithms in
the literature are model-based, in the sense that the MARL model is first estimated, and
then used as a nominal one to design algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, the only
existing model-based MARL algorithms include the early one in Brafman and Tennen-
holtz (2000) that solves single-controller-stochastic games, a special zero-sum MG; and
the later improved one in Brafman and Tennenholtz (2002), named R-MAX, for zero-sum
MGs. These algorithms are also built upon the principle of optimism in the face of uncer-
tainty (Auer and Ortner, 2007; Jaksch et al., 2010), as several aforementioned model-free
ones. Considering recent progresses in model-based RL, especially its provable advan-
tages over model-free ones in certain regimes (Tu and Recht, 2018; Sun et al., 2019), it is
worth generalizing these results to MARL to improve its sample efficiency.
Convergence of policy gradient methods: As mentioned in §4.3, the convergence result
of vanilla policy gradient method in general MARL is mostly negative, i.e., it may avoid
even the local NE points in many cases. This is essentially related to the challenge of
non-stationarity in MARL, see §3.2. Even though some remedies have been advocated
(Balduzzi et al., 2018; Letcher et al., 2019; Chasnov et al., 2019; Fiez et al., 2019) to sta-
bilizing the convergence in general continuous games, these assumptions are not easily
verified/satisfied in MARL, e.g., even in the simplest LQ setting (Mazumdar et al., 2019),
as they depend not only on the model, but also on the policy parameterization. Due to this
subtlety, it may be interesting to explore the (global) convergence of policy-based methods
for MARL, probably starting with the simple LQ setting, i.e., general-sum LQ games, in
analogy to that for the zero-sum counterpart (Zhang et al., 2019; Bu et al., 2019). Such an
exploration may also benefit from the recent advances of nonconvex-(non)concave opti-
mization (Lin et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2019; Nouiehed et al., 2019).
MARL with robustness/safety concerns: Concerning the challenge of non-unique learn-
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ing goals in MARL (see §3.1), we believe it is of merit to consider robustness and/or safety
constraints in MARL. To the best of our knowledge, this is still a relatively uncharted
territory. In fact, safe RL has been recognized as one of the most significant challenges
in the single-agent setting (Garcı´a and Ferna´ndez, 2015). With more than one agents
that may have conflicted objectives, guaranteeing safety becomes more involved, as the
safety requirement now concerns the coupling of all agents. One straightforward model
is constrained multi-agent MDPs/Markov games, with the constraints characterizing the
safety requirement. Learning with provably safety guarantees in this setting is non-trivial,
but necessary for some safety-critical MARL applications as autonomous driving (Shalev-
Shwartz et al., 2016) and robotics (Kober et al., 2013). In addition, it is also natural to
think of robustness against adversarial agents, especially in the decentralized/distributed
cooperative MARL settings as in Zhang et al. (2018); Chen et al. (2018); Wai et al. (2018),
where the adversary may disturb the learning process in an anonymous way – a common
scenario in distributed systems. Recent development of robust distributed supervised-
learning against Byzantine adversaries (Chen et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2018) may be useful
in this context.
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